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BIOPROSPECTING ON PUBLIC LANDS:
SHOULD PRIVATE COMPANIES COMPENSATE




While biotechnology has been exploited by mankind for
millennia,' in recent years the practice has become a billion-dollar
industry.2 Biotechnology may be defined as "any technological
application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or
derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for
specific use."3 The biotechnology industry, particularly in the areas
of pharmaceuticals and agriculture,4 uses bioprospecting to gather
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2001; M.A., University of the Sorbonne,
1994; B.A., University of the Sorbonne, 1992. This Note is dedicated to Jeff
Ketterling for his unconditional love and support.
' Linda Maher, The Environment and the Domestic Regulatory Framework
for Biotechnology, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LrIG. 133, 134 (1993) (noting that "[t]he
benefits to man from biotechnological processes can be traced back to yeast
fermentation in 6000 B.C."). Generally, Maher notes that as "the United States
continues to lead the biotechnology industry in research and development, trade,
patents, and environmental regulation .... [m]ore needs to be done, especially
in the areas of independent testing and risk assessment" in order to study the
impact of biotechnology on local ecosystems and to ensure the protection of the
Earth's environment. Id. at 197-98.
2 John R. Adair, Comment, The Bioprospecting Question: Should the United
States Charge Biotechnology Companies for the Commercial Use of Public Wild
Genetic Resources?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131, 135 (1997).
' United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention
on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 [hereinafter
Biodiversity Treaty].
4 See, e.g., Maher, supra note 1, at 175-76 (explaining the various
applications of bioprospecting to the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries);
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the wild genetic resources it needs to then develop commercial
products.' Bioprospecting has been described by one commentator
as "[t]he search of wild diversity for valuable genetic informa-
tion ' and by another as "the search for genetic and biochemical
resources in nature."7
United States public lands are a prime source of bioprospect-
ing' and biotechnology companies derive substantial profits from
the wild genetic resources they find on public lands. 9 In spite of
the revenues generated by such uses of natural resources, the
federal agencies responsible for regulating and managing public
lands have, until now, not shared in any of the profits reaped by
biotechnology companies.1° Profit-sharing, however, presents
Adair, supra note 2, at 139-40 (noting that the pharmaceutical industry "has been
one of the major beneficiaries of bioprospecting activity" and that "genetic
engineering technology has increased the potential value of wild genetic
resources to the agricultural industry"). See also Dana Clark & David Downes,
What Price Biodiversity? Economic Incentives and Biodiversity Conversion in the
United States, 11 J. ENvTL. L. & LrrIG. 9, 39 (1996) (explaining how "[glenetic
diversity is both crucial to agriculture and threatened by modem, large-scale,
consolidated agribusiness").
' Adair, supra note 2, at 137-38.
6 Adair, supra note 2, at 138.
7 Carla Mattix, The Debate over Bioprospecting on the Public Lands, 13
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 528 (1999). See also Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D.
Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the Biodiversity
Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 706 (1995) (defining bioprospect-
ing as the "search for bioactive compounds contained in natural sources such as
plants, fungi, insects, microbes, and marine organisms"); Margot Cohen, Forest
Fire: The Biodiversity Debate Heats Up in Asia, FAR E. ECON. REv., Jan. 11,
1996, at 66 (defining bioprospecting as the "search for wild species of flora and
fauna whose genes can yield new medicines and improved crops").
8 Adair, supra note 2, at 138, 171 (stating that, as bioprospecting activities
increase on federal lands, the United States must address the issue of profit-
sharing to permit the government to benefit from the private use of its wild
genetic resources).
9 Adair, supra note 2, at 132-33, 139-40 (defining wild genetic resources as
"the genetic and biochemical information found in wild plants, animals and
microorganisms"). See also Mattix, supra note 7, at 528; Maher, supra note 1,
at 175.
10 See Mattix, supra note 7, at 528; Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 65
(discussing the fact that, although scientists are allowed to collect "diverse
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many advantages to both the government and the public." There-
fore, the benefits must be recognized and profit-sharing should be
permitted. Since the existing judicial and legislative framework
does not address profit-sharing adequately, a new framework must
be developed.'2 Once new legislation specifically addressing the
issue is enacted, it will serve as a guide to the courts in resolving
the concerns raised by profit-sharing and will enable a system of
profit-sharing to be implemented. New legislation, thus, is essential
for the national parks and, therefore, the public to benefit from the
numerous advantages presented by profit-sharing.
This Note focuses on the principle of profit-sharing and
examines whether the federal agencies regulating public lands
should be permitted to share in the profits gained by private
companies from products derived from natural resources collected
on public lands. Part I presents an overview of bioprospecting on
federal public lands and examines the regulatory framework for the
management of public lands. Part I also discusses bioprospecting
activities since the 1960s and the bioprospecting issue recently
raised in Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt, a case disallowing a profit-
sharing arrangement. 3 Part II describes existing legislation and
species on public lands" free of charge, they "have no obligation to return a
share of the profits [resulting from products derived from the organisms
collected] to the public" if "valuable compounds are discovered").
" See Adair, supra note 2, at 133 (explaining that profit-sharing with respect
to bioprospecting means compensation to the federal government "when a
commercial enterprise wants to extract wild genetic resources from its public
lands in the hopes of developing a valuable commercial product"). See also infra
notes 171-174 and accompanying text (explaining that profit-sharing benefits the
environment and the public by enabling the government to reinvest the profits
gained into natural resource protection and preservation of the beauty of public
lands, and that profit-sharing is a fair way of ensuring that the government
benefits from the nation's economic success).
12 See infra Part II (discussing existing legal doctrines and their potential
application to the issue of profit-sharing).
'3 42 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that Yellowstone National Park
must suspend implementation of an agreement it entered into with a private
corporation whereby the Park would receive a part of the profits derived from
commercialization of wild genetic resources found on its territory, pending
completion of required studies on the environmental impact of collecting such
resources).
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judicial decisions that arguably may be used to resolve the issue of
profit-sharing, particularly in the areas of constitutional, property,
and environmental law. Part III explains why new legislation is
needed to establish standards and provide guidance on the issue of
profit-sharing. This Part also provides some background of profit-
sharing at the international level, explains why judicial precedent
is not sufficient to resolve the issue of profit-sharing, raises
arguments in favor of and against profit-sharing, and gives an
overview of recently enacted legislation regulating national parks.
Finally, this Note concludes that a logical outcome of the Edmonds
Institute case would be to permit federal agencies to share in the
profits derived from uses of natural resources found on public lands
and that consistent application of profit-sharing principles necessi-
tates the enactment of additional legislation.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF BIOPROSPECTING ON FEDERAL PUBLIC
LANDS
Federal public lands are a significant source of bioprospecting
for biotechnology companies.1 4 After examining the laws govern-
ing those lands and the mandates of the agencies managing them,
it is unclear whether bioprospecting activities fall within their
accepted uses. Recent bioprospecting activities on public lands have
sparked renewed controversy on acceptable uses of public lands
and ignited debate as to whether the government should profit from
commercial development of public natural resources. This contro-
versy has been illustrated recently in Edmonds Institute.15 In order
to understand why profit-sharing in the context of bioprospecting
on public lands is a controversial issue, it is necessary to explore
the management of federal public lands, explain the recent develop-
ments that have renewed the debate, and analyze the issue as raised
in Edmonds Institute.
"4 See Adair, supra note 2, at 138 (noting that, even though some biopros-
pecting is conducted on privately-owned land, public lands generally offer "a
greater variety of wild genetic resources").
"5 42 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).
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A. Regulation of Federal Public Lands
In the United States, federal public lands include lands managed
by several federal agencies. These include the Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM"),16 the National Park Service ("NPS"),17
16 See Dennis Michaels, Bioprospecting Agreements: Forging a Comprehen-
sive Strategy for Managing Genetic Resources on Public Lands, 22-SPG
ENvIRONs ENvTL. L. & POL'Y J. 3 (1999) (discussing the mandates of the
various land management agencies under the supervision of the Department of
the Interior and stating that a comprehensive genetic resource management
strategy is necessary to ensure the preservation of genetic resources on public
lands). The BLM, under the control of the Department of the Interior, has
jurisdiction over "residual lands that have not been specifically designated to a
particular use such as wilderness, national park or national forest" and "must
observe the principles of multiple use and sustained yield in its formation of
plans and management activities." Id. at 23-24. Examples of multiple uses of
public lands are conservation, preservation, and recreation. Id. at 22. See also
Marla E. Mansfield, A Primer of Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REv. 801, 854
(1993) (explaining that sustained yield means "the achievement and maintenance
in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various
renewable resources of the national forests without impairment of the productivi-
ty of the land"). The mandate of the BLM is delimited by the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA") (43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784
(1994 & Supp. III 1997)), which "does not give the BLM any authority to
'classify' lands per se" for any specific use. Id. at 829. In enacting the FLPMA,
Congress defined the role of the BLM as a "land manager" the central function
of which was planning. Id. at 833. Despite that newly established function,
"grazing and mineral functions [have] remain[ed] strong elements of [the BLM's]
role" since the enactment of the FLPMA. Id. Additionally, the FLPMA "directed
the BLM to consider disparate values in furthering the 'national interest' without
demanding a specific result" and Congress "did not order the BLM to favor
resource use or non-use" of the federal lands under its authority. Id. at 834.
17 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing that "[tihere
is created in the Department of the Interior a service to be called the [NPS]" and
that the NPS shall "promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas" under its
jurisdiction so as to fulfill the fundamental purpose of such areas, which is "to
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means
as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations"); 16
U.S.C. § 3 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (stating that it is the role of the NPS to use
and manage the "parks, monuments, and reservations under [its] jurisdiction").
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the Forest Service,18  and the Fish and Wildlife Service("FWS").19 These four federal agencies regulate and maintain
8 See Michaels, supra note 16, at 23 (explaining that the Forest Service,
regulated by the Department of Agriculture, has the authority to manage
"recreation, range, timber, watershed[,] wildlife and fish"); Mansfield, supra note
16, at 838 (explaining that the Forest Service was established by the Organic
Administration Act of 1897 ("OAA") (16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482 (1994)) for the
purposes of "watershed protection" and "timber production"). Protection of the
forests themselves was not one of the purposes and "was only operative in regard
to the watershed and timber purposes." Mansfield, supra note 16, at 838. Despite
the limited purpose set forth by the OAA, legislation enacted since "has
increased the management mandates for the National Forests, and many of the
mineral laws applicable of BLM lands also operate in National Forests."
Mansfield, supra note 16, at 838. Specifically, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act of 1960 (16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994)) established additional purposes for
the Forest Service, including "outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and
wildlife and fish purposes." Mansfield, supra note 16, at 840. Further, the
National Forest Management Act of 1976 (16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)) mandated "various silviculture standards and extensive planning
for [National] [F]orests." Mansfield, supra note 16, at 841.
"9 See National Conservation Training Ctr., Origins of the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.nctc.fws.gov/history/-
origin.html> (noting that the mission of the FWS is to protect fish and wildlife,
including endangered plants and animals, by establishing and maintaining
"national wildlife refuges" and to regulate migratory bird hunting and protect
bird habitat); Mansfield, supra note 16, at 846-47 (noting that the FWS manages
the National Wildlife Refuge System "for the primary purpose of protecting and
promoting wildlife values" and that wildlife refuges may be used for other
activities such as mining and recreation, although recreational use may only be
"appropriate incidental or secondary use" not inconsistent with the primary
purpose of each refuge). Mansfield explains that, "[1]ike statutes that create
National Parks, any statute creating a specific refuge must be consulted to
determine what uses are allowed in that refuge" and that "[iun the 1960s,
however, three acts were passed as generic authority to manage the refuges."
Mansfield, supra note 16, at 846. Those three acts are: the Refuge Recreation
Act of 1962 (16 U.S.C. §§ 460k to 460k-4 (1994)); the Refuge Revenue Sharing
Act of 1964 (16 U.S.C. § 715s (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); and the National
Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966 (16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). Mansfield, supra note 16, at 846. See also Edward J.
Heisel, Comment, Biodiversity and Federal Land Ownership: Mapping a
Strategy for the Future, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 229, 238-39 (1998) (explaining that
"the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) is the only extensive system of
federal lands administered specifically for wildlife conservation purposes" and
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federal public lands under Congressional mandates.2 ° Since this
Note discusses the issue of profit-sharing in light of recent
bioprospecting developments in Yellowstone National Park,2' the
mandate granted to the NPS and its regulation of the national parks
is of particular importance.
Congress designated Yellowstone National Park, the first of its
kind, in 1872.22 Several national parks were subsequently estab-
lished,23 indicating the beginning of the system of national parks.
The NPS was later created by the National Park Service Organic
Act of 1916 ("NPSOA")24 as an agency of the Department of the
that the NWRS, established in 1966 by the National Wildlife Refuge System
Administration Act, "consists of approximately 500 refuges," which are "found
in every state" and represent "over 87 million acres"). Most refuges established
after the first ones were designated by President Theodore Roosevelt at the
beginning of the twentieth century, and "have been established administratively
by the Secretary of the Interior under various statutory authorities, although
Congress has created over thirty refuges by specific legislation." Id. at 238.
Finally, "[a]lthough the NWRS is geared primarily toward preserving wildlife
habitat, the laws governing its management fail to prohibit some activities that
may negatively impact wildlife" and "hunting, fishing, trapping, and some
'commercial' activities, such as mining and hay cutting, are allowed on the
refuges," although President Clinton and Congress have taken recent steps to
minimize activities having a potential negative effect on the wildlife refuges. Id.
at 239-40.
20 See generally Mansfield, supra note 16, at 831-48; Heisel, supra note 19,
at 238-47 (explaining the statutes governing each agency and the role played by
each agency in the management of different kinds of public lands).
21 See Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1999)
(explaining the novel bioprospecting agreement between Yellowstone National
Park and Diversa Corporation providing for potential financial returns to the Park
in exchange for Diversa's use and commercialization of natural resources found
in the Park).
22 See Heisel, supra note 19, at 241. See also 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-22 (1994)
(codifying the creation of Yellowstone National Park).
23 See Robert B. Keiter, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: Law,
Policy, and Science in a Dynamic Environment, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 649, 653
(1997) (listing Yosemite, Mount Rainier, and Glacier National Parks as parks
designated next). See also 16 U.S.C. §§ 41, 43 (1994) (codifying the 1890
establishment of Sequoia National Park); 16 U.S.C. §§ 91-92 (1994) (codifying
the 1899 establishment of Mount Rainier National Park); 16 U.S.C. §§ 161-162
(1994) (codifying the 1910 establishment of Glacier National Park).
24 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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Interior25 to regulate the national parks.2 6 NPSOA provides that
the purpose of the national parks is "to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations. ' 27
Pursuant to its authority under NPSOA,8 the NPS has enacted
regulations expanding on the authorized or prohibited uses of the
national parks.29 As illustrated by these governing laws, there
exists a tension between the requirement of protection of the wild
resources found in national parks and that of access to the public
for its use and enjoyment.30 This tension has been exacerbated in
recent years as a growing number of institutions have requested
access to natural resources found in national parks for bioprospect-
ing purposes.3'
25 See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Frequently Asked Questions, What Are the
Responsibilities of the Department of Interior? (visited Feb. 20, 2000)
<http://www.doi.gov/faq/#13> (stating that the Department of the Interior,
established in 1849, is the "nation's principal conservation agency" and is
responsible for most of the federal public lands and natural resources). See also
Michaels, supra note 16, at 20 (noting that the Department of the Interior
"administers lands held by the National Park Service (80 million acres), Bureau
of Land Management (450 million acres), and the Fish and Wildlife Service
(88.5 million acres)" while the Department of Agriculture has authority over the
lands managed by the National Forest Service, which represent 187 million
acres).
26 Mansfield, supra note 16, at 842-43; 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) (granting the Secretary of the Interior the authority to "make and publish
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary or proper for the use and
management of the parks, monuments, and reservations under the jurisdiction of
the National Park Service").
27 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
28 See 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); 16 U.S.C. § 22 (1994).
29 See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(c)(3)(v) (1999) (prohibiting the "[s]ale or
commercial use of natural products" found in national parks); 36 C.F.R. § 2.5
(1999) (providing for the issuance of specimen collection permits under certain
circumstances).
30 See Mansfield, supra note 16, at 843; Heisel, supra note 19, at 242.
31 See Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting
that in recent years the NPS has granted approximately 250 to 300 research
permits annually, including 40 or 50 for "microbial research projects").
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B. Recent Bioprospecting Activities
The NPS has permitted bioprospecting on public lands for over
a century.32 For example, pursuant to NPS regulations, members
of a "reputable scientific or educational institution" or a "State or
Federal agency" may obtain permits authorizing them to gather
wild genetic resources found in national parks. 33 Despite its long-
standing allowance, some bioprospecting discoveries over the past
four decades have given the issue a new significance.
One major national park-derived resource, famous for the
biotechnology process to which it led and for the millions of
dollars in profits it has since generated, is that of a microorganism
known as Thermus aquaticus or Taq. 4 Thermus aquaticus, a
"virtually invisible heat-loving microbe ' '35 thriving in the hot
springs of Yellowstone National Park, was discovered in 1966 by
a scientist who had undertaken research to study thermophiles.36
Twenty years after Thermus aquaticus was discovered and
submitted to a collection center, it was used to create the "Taq
polymerase chain reaction, 37 a novel process with various DNA-
32 Id. (noting that according to the NPS, "the earliest research permit
authorizing collection of microbial samples from [Yellowstone National Park]
was in 1898").
3 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.5, 2.5(b) (1999).
3 Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 67; Mattix, supra note 7, at 528. See
also The Official Website of Yellowstone National Park, Bioprospecting (last
modified Sept. 1, 1999) <http://www.nps.gov./htdocs4/yell/nature/thermophiles/-
biopro.html> [hereinafter Yellowstone].
15 Mattix, supra note 7, at 528.
36 A "thermophile" is defined as "an organism adapted to living at high
temperatures, [such] as some bacteria and algae." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 1476 (2d ed. 1986).
" Mattix, supra note 7, at 528. See Yellowstone, supra note 34 (stating that
a research worker invented the process when he developed "the idea of using a
heat-stable enzyme to produce unlimited copies of 'target' DNA [and that the]
enzyme named in the patenting of [polymerase chain reaction] was DNA
polymerase from Taq"). Additionally, the usefulness of the Taq polymerase chain
reaction arises from the fact that, "[d]ue to its tolerance for near-boiling
temperatures, a product of Taq DNA polymerase performs the enzymatic
amplification of DNA on an industrial scale." Yellowstone, supra note 34.
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related applications. 38 The process was patented by a biotechnolo-
gy company and the patent rights later sold to the pharmaceutical
company Hoffman-La Roche for $300 million.39 Despite the
increasing revenues generated by the discovery of the microorgan-
ism on its land, the NPS has not received any part thereof.4° This
incident led the NPS to enter into a new kind of agreement with a
private corporation, whereby the NPS would be entitled to a
percentage of any potential revenues generated by the results of the
licensed corporation's bioprospecting activities.4 1
38 DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is defined as "an essential component of
all living matter and a basic material in the chromosomes of the cell nucleus
[which] contains the genetic code and transmits the hereditary pattern."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 413, 378 (2d ed. 1986). See Yellowstone,
supra note 34 (noting that a major application is DNA fingerprinting technolo-
gy); Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1999) (listing DNA
fingerprinting, cancer fighting, and adding that the technology has "numerous
applications in medicine, law enforcement, and other fields"). See also Frank
Clifford, Simpson Case Boosts Microbe Conservation, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31,
1994, at Al (listing the following uses of Thermus aquaticus: "police work,"
"diagnoses of the human immunodeficiency virus, Alzheimer's disease and sickle
cell anemia," "sweetening agents for the soft drink industry," "high-powered
stain removers in detergents," and "catalysts in the manufacture of clean-burning
fuels").
39 Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 67; Mattix, supra note 7, at 528. See
also Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 6-7.
o Yellowstone, supra note 34 (noting that "annual sales of Taq polymerase
since 1991 have grown from $200 million to $500 million"). See also Edmonds
Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 6-7; Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 67; Mattix, supra
note 7, at 528.
n" Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 4. In Edmonds Institute, the NPS entered
into a cooperative research and development agreement ("CRADA") with a
private corporation whereby that corporation "would obtain a nonexclusive right
to 'bioprospect' microbial organisms in Yellowstone, in exchange for an
agreement to share potential financial returns with [Yellowstone National] Park."
Id. Significant commercial applications other than that of Thermus aquaticus are
based on "heat-stable enzymes from [Yellowstone National Park]'s thermal
basins," for example, the use of "Thermoanaerobacter ethanolicus" for
"converting cellulose from waste products into ethanol for use as gasohol," "bio-
leaching of gold ore," "removal of paint from military aircraft," and "food
processing." Yellowstone, supra note 34; Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 6.
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Another famous case of a natural resource found on public
lands that led to a revenue-generating commercial product is that
of the bark of the Pacific yew tree.42 In 1962, the United States
Drug Administration collected such bark, and discovered a few
years later that taxol, one of the chemicals it contained, inhibited
cancer activity.4 3 After a couple decades of further research, taxol
was marketed as a drug for the treatment of certain forms of
cancer.' Because taxol can only be extracted from the bark of the
Pacific yew tree by destroying the tree, its development has had
destructive consequences on Pacific yews found in United States
national forests.45 To determine the scope of the potentially
42 See Maria Costello & Kelly Kellmel, Medical Attributes of Taxus
Brevifolia-The Pacific Yew (last updated July 1997) <http://wilkes 1.wilkes.edu/-
-kklemow/Taxus.html> (describing the Pacific yew as a "small, slow growing
evergreen tree native to the northwestern United States"); Ecosystem Processes
Network-NRCan-CFS-Pacific Forestry Centre, Questions & Answers (visited
Nov. 27, 1999) <http://www.pfc.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/ecosystem/yew/qanda.html>
(specifying that Pacific yew trees, which grow also in British Columbia,
"generally live 200-300 years with some specimens [reaching] 400 years or
more," that they generally do not reach "great heights," although 25-meter trees
have been found, and that diameters are variable, some trees reaching 0.85 meter
in diameter).
43 Adair, supra note 2, at 151-53; Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 67.
4Adair, supra note 2, at 151-53; Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 67. See
also Vanessa Hill, The Anti-Cancer Drug Taxol: A Case for or Against Chemical
Prospecting? (visited Nov. 27, 1999) <http://www.colostate.edu/Depts/-
Entomology/courses/en570/papers 1996/hill.html> (noting that taxol "has proven
to be effective against ovarian, breast, lung, head and neck, and esophageal
cancers" and that the Food and Drug Administration has approved its use for
treatment of ovarian and breast cancers); Charles L. Bolsinger and Annabelle E.
Jaramillo, Taxus Brevifolia Nutt, Pacific Yew, Special Uses (visited Nov. 27,
1999) <http://willow.ncfes.umn.edu:80/silvicsmanual/Volume_1/taxus/-
brevifolia.htm> (noting that the use of taxol has had a favorable impact on the
treatment of "refractory ovarian cancer").
4" See Hill, supra note 44 (noting that because the bark of each tree contains
only a very small amount of taxol and "bark cannot be harvested without killing
the tree," taxol cannot be produced in an unlimited manner without damage to
the ecosystem and to the survival of the Pacific yew species). But see United
States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Oregon State
Office, Questions and Answers; Pacific Yew Act (last modified Feb. 12, 1998)
<http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/or/fy98/IBs/b98256.htm> [hereinafter Oregon
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negative consequences, Bristol-Myers Squibb,46 the pharmaceuti-
cal company that has marketed taxol, has funded studies on the
issue." In addition to financing studies, Bristol-Myers Squibb
recently made a $3.4 million royalty payment to the National
Health Institute in return for "additional rights that extend [the
company's] monopoly on [taxol]. ' 48 That payment was made in
response to "criticism of the original deal in which the government
gave the company rights to [t]axol without seeking any direct
payback. '' 49 The funding of studies and the royalty payment make
the case of the Pacific yew tree distinguishable from that of
Thermus aquaticus, where the NPS received neither compensation
for the use of its natural resources nor financial contribution for the
government's studying of the effects of bioprospecting on the
environment.5° The total cost to Bristol-Myers Squibb of studying
Pacific yew trees and developing taxol for commercialization,
State Office] (pointing out that "[n]o Pacific yew resources have been sold from
Forest Service administered lands for taxol since the fall of 1993," that plans
have been implemented to "ensure the continued existence of yew through
ecosystem-based management practices," that over 50 million Pacific yew trees
are still in existence in Oregon and Washington National Forests and BLM
administered lands, and that the Pacific yew is not an endangered species).
46 See Li Fellers, The Medicine Market, WASH. POST, May 31, 1998, at W10
(noting that Bristol-Myers Squibb, an "international conglomerate that domi-
nate[s] the cancer drug market" and a Fortune 500 company, sells not only drugs
but also nutritional and beauty care products such as baby formula and hair
coloring).
47 See Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 67. See also Exclusive Rights to
Pacific Yew Bark Awarded; Congressman Upset by Bristol-Myers' Comer on
Market, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 20, 1991, at B5 (pointing out that
Bristol-Myers Squibb had agreed to pay the Forest Service to "count, conserve,
research and collect bark from some of the estimated 23 million yew trees across
8 million acres of national forests"). In addition to funding studies, Bristol-Myers
Squibb has also developed synthetic sources of taxol. See Oregon State Office,
supra note 45 (noting that in 1994, Bristol-Myers Squibb developed "an
alternative, semi-synthetic source of taxol from the foliage of European yew
trees"). But see Hill, supra note 44 (stating that to date, "no large scale, synthetic
method [of producing taxol] has been developed").
" Public Handouts Enrich Drug Makers, Scientists, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
5, 1998, at Al.
49 Id.
50 Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 67.
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however, remains significantly lower than the profits the company
has gained from marketing the drug.51
C. Edmonds Institute:52 A New Perspective on
Bioprospecting
As Edmonds Institute embodies the first judicial challenge to an
agreement that would enable the NPS to reap profits from the use
of wild genetic resources found in national parks,53 it provides a
new perspective on the issue of profit-sharing in the context of
bioprospecting. The litigation in Edmonds Institute was sparked by
Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt,54
5' See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 1998 Annual Report, Financial Review,
Business Segments, Medicines (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://wwwbristolmyers.-
com/newsfinance/annual/98annu/finrev/data/frpg5a.htm> (reporting that in 1998,
worldwide sales of anti-cancer drugs increased 21% to $2,925 million and that
sales of Taxol alone increased 28% to $1,206 million). Additionally, revenues
from Taxol are likely to increase further in the near future due to the Food and
Drug Administration's approval in April 1998 of Taxol as a "first line treatment
of ovarian cancer in combination with [Bristol-Myers Squibb's ovarian cancer
drug] cisplatin" and to the European Union's approval in September 1998 of
Taxol for "non-small cell lung cancer." Id. See also Fellers, supra note 46, at
WlO (reporting that between December 1992 and May 1998, sales of Taxol
amounted to $2.8 billion and that in 1997, Taxol "accounted for nearly 40
percent of Bristol's cancer drug sales"). Fellers further stated that stock analysts
predicted Taxol's "slice of [Bristol-Myers Squibb's cancer drug] sales" to "soar
to 55 percent" by 2004. Fellers, supra note 46, at WlO. In comparison to those
sale revenues, the "$65 million to $114 million" Bristol-Myers Squibb agreed to
spend on research, manufacturing of the drug, and clinical trials appear insignifi-
cant. Fellers, supra note 46, at W1O. Even though Bristol-Myers Squibb asserted
that it had spent $1 billion on the development of the drug since 1991, that is
still a lower amount than the profits it has received to date from its commercial-
ization of Taxol. Fellers, supra note 46, at W1O.
52 42 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).
5' Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 4-5 (recognizing that this case is the first
litigation of its kind, i.e., challenging a CRADA that provides for profit-sharing
between a federal agency and a private corporation in exchange for the
corporation's conduct of bioprospecting and that the CRADA at issue is the first
involving a national park).
' See United States Department of the Interior, Frequently Asked Questions,
What Does the Secretary of the Interior Do? (visited Feb. 20, 2000)
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NPS Director Robert Stanton,55 and Yellowstone National Park
Superintendent Mike Finley s56 announcement on August 17, 1997
<http://www.doi.gov/faq/#I2> (explaining that the Secretary of the Interior, who
is a member of the President's cabinet, is currently "responsible for the
management of nearly half a million acres of federal lands" and that such
responsibility includes the tasks of "enforc[ing] laws that protect threatened and
endangered species and that govern the management of national wildlife
refuges," and "work[ing] closely with Indian Tribal leaders to insure that
reservations receive adequate economic, educational and social services").
" See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing that the Director
of the NPS "shall be appointed by the President [of the United States], by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate"). Additionally, the Director of the
NPS "shall have substantial experience and demonstrated competence in land
management and natural or cultural resource conservation." Id. In order to
perform the task of "promot[ing] and regulat[ing] the use of... national parks,
monuments, and reservations," the Director of the NPS "shall select two Deputy
Directors," the first of whom "shall have responsibility for [NPS] operations" and
the second of whom "shall have responsibility for other programs assigned to the
[NPS]." Id. Generally, the Director of the NPS shall "under the direction of the
Secretary of the Interior, have the supervision, management, and control of the
several national parks and national monuments which on August 25, 1916 were
under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior" and shall have the same
control of "such other national parks and reservations of like character as may
be created by Congress." 16 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
56 See Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, Glacier National Park and Its
Neighbors: A Study of Federal Interagency Relations, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207,
259 (1987) (noting that national park superintendents are "professional managers
who want to maximize their own judgment, discretion, and inventiveness, and to
be free of outside forces dictating what shall happen on their turf"). Superin-
tendents readily accept Congress' authority over the mandates granted federal
public land management agencies rather than attempt to "determine the
fundamentals of' the policies governing national parks, but also want broad
mandates so as not to be "reduced to mere pawns mechanically applying rules."
Id. See also Lindsey Kate Shaw, Comment, Land Use Planning at the National
Parks: Canyonlands National Park and Off-Road Vehicles, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
795, 797-98 (1997) (explaining the decentralized structure of the NPS and
management of the national parks by noting that the NPS is "headed by a
director who oversees ten regional offices, each with its own regional director"
and that each park's superintendent carries out planning efforts in cooperation
with the corresponding regional director). Shaw further points out that the "daily
management of each park" is almost entirely the responsibility of the park's
superintendent and that, although a "patchwork of statutes, regulations, and
guidelines" directs "the superintendent's planning and management decisions,"
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that "the federal government had entered into a novel contract with
San Diego-based Diversa Corporation57 by which Diversa would
obtain a nonexclusive right to 'bioprospect' microbial organisms in
Yellowstone, in exchange for an agreement to share potential
each superintendent "remains relatively unconstrained." Id. at 798.
17 See Diversa Corporation, Corporate Information, Corporate Overview
(visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.diversa.com/corpinfo/corpover.asp>
(describing Diversa as a "global leader in discovering and developing novel
enzymes and other biologically active compounds, together known as biomole-
cules, from diverse environmental sources for use in agricultural, chemical
processing, industrial and pharmaceutical applications"); Diversa Corporation,
Technology Platform, Biodiversity Access (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.-
diversa.com/techplat/disc.asp> (noting that Diversa has "[b]iodiversity access
agreements" with numerous countries besides the United States, including
Bermuda, Costa Rica, Iceland, Indonesia, and Mexico, and that such agreements
enable Diversa to "collect DNA that may produce beneficial bioactive molecules
and enzymes" from those countries); Diversa Corporation, Press Releases,
Current Releases (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.diversa.comlpresrele/-
currele/20000107.asp> (stating that Diversa owns several patents for "methods
for discovering bioactive compounds from gene expression libraries [in which]
mixed populations of organisms [are organized and catalogued]"). See also
Diversa Corp., THE IPO REP., Feb. 7, 2000 (reporting that Diversa's enzymes
and "other compounds from environmental sources" have numerous applications,
including in the agricultural, industrial, and pharmaceutical areas, and that
Diversa has already commercialized a product and "has 42 other projects with
multiple production applications in various stages of development"); Mary
Welch, Diversa Raises $200.1M in IPO; Stock Takes Off on First Day,
BIOWORLD TODAY, Feb. 15, 2000 (pointing out Diversa's successful initial public
offering ("IPO") and stating that Diversa applies the methods it develops to the
acquisition of "previously unaccessed genetic material from uncultured organisms
found in [the] natural environments [of numerous countries]"); Rhonda L.
Rundle, Diversa Shares Triple on First Day, Boosted by Enthusiasm for Biotech
Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2000, at B7 (reporting the more than tripled value
of Diversa's shares on their first day of trading and pointing out the various
applications of the enzymes Diversa has developed from samples collected in
several countries); Biotech Co. Diversa Up on First Day of Trading, Dow JONES
NEWS SERV., Feb. 14, 2000 (noting Diversa's considerable rise in revenues
between 1998 and 1999); Patent Disclosures, BIOWORLD TODAY, Jan. 20, 2000
(reporting the issuance of a patent to Diversa for "methods for forming
normalized DNA libraries"); Press Release: Diversa Gets Gene Discovery
Patent, Dow JoNES NEws SERv., Mar. 3, 2000 (announcing Diversa's new
patent for "sequence-based gene discovery from the environment").
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financial returns with the Park., 58 Even though a cooperative
58 Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 4. The financial arrangement is
described as follows by Yellowstone National Park:
Diversa agreed to pay Yellowstone $25,000 a year for five years for
permission to collect microbes in the park. If Diversa develops a
profitable product from research based on Yellowstone microbes, the
park will also be entitled to a royalty based on the profits. The
agreement does not enable Diversa to do anything that was not already
allowed under the NPS research permit system; it simply provides
compensation to the park for access.
Yellowstone, supra note 34. See also Tom Laceky, Park Service Won't Fight
Judge's Order over Research Contract, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, March
25, 1999 (stating that Diversa "agreed to pay Yellowstone $175,000 over five
years, plus an undisclosed percentage of whatever commercial profits grow from
its microbe research" and that the secrecy of the CRADA is the basis for a
separate suit by the Edmonds Institute plaintiffs). Yellowstone National Park
explained that confidentiality was required by the existence of trade secrets,
"commercial and pricing interests," the disclosure of which could be harmful to
Diversa and could prevent the federal government from negotiating "the most
advantageous arrangements for benefit-sharing related to permitted park re-
search." Yellowstone, supra note 34. However, Yellowstone National Park
disclosed "that the royalties that could result from [its agreement with Diversa]
range up to 10 percent of net revenues earned by Diversa on research results
involving biological samples from the park." Yellowstone, supra note 34. As
Yellowstone National Park declined to release the details of the CRADA,
specifically its financial and technological provisions, Edmonds Institute filed a
Freedom of Information Act action in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia requesting access to the CRADA. See Edmonds Inst. v.
National Park Serv., No. 98-482 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 25, 1998). This action is
separate from the Edmonds Institute case, which is the basis for this Note, and
was recently settled. Michael Milstein, Microbes for Money, BILLINGS GAZETrE
(Mont.), Jan. 11, 2000, at 1B (stating that the NPS released the confidential
details of the CRADA, including the facts that, under the agreement, Diversa
would pay the NPS "one-half percent of the net sales of any commercial
products" derived from organisms found in Yellowstone National Park, "3
percent of the net sales of 'research reagent or diagnostic' products based on the
genetic codes" of such organisms, and "8 percent of net sales of 'native enzymes
purified from cultured microorganisms"' collected in the Park); Interior's
Disclosure Prompts New Slap at Yellowstone CRADA, FED. TECH. REP., Jan. 13,
2000, at 9 (announcing the settlement of the Freedom of Information Act action,
reporting the royalties of 0.5%, 3%, and 8% provided for in the CRADA, and
noting that the annual $20,000 Diversa agreed to pay for five years in return for
collecting samples "would be reduced by any revenues [Yellowstone National
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research and development agreement ("CRADA") had been entered
into between a federal agency and a non-federal party and
challenged in court before Edmonds Institute,9 that agreement did
not include the profit-sharing provision included in the CRADA at
issue in Edmonds Institute.6° As noted by the court, the profit-
sharing provision was the "most innovative feature" of the CRADA
between the government and Diversa Corporation. 6' The plaintiffs
in Edmonds Institute filed suit after the NPS denied their request
that it not enter into a CRADA with Diversa Corporation without
notifying the public and conducting an environmental impact
assessment.62 The plaintiffs alleged that, by entering into a
Park] received from product sales").
" See Chem Serv., Inc. v. Environmental Monitoring Sys. Lab., 12 F.3d
1256, 1258 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a competitor to several private
laboratories had standing to sue the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
to enjoin the EPA from performing certain functions agreed to in CRADAs
between the EPA and the private laboratories).
o See Chem Serv., 12 F.3d at 1258-61; Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 4-
6. Chem Service may be distinguished from Edmonds Institute on the following
grounds: (i) unlike Edmonds Institute, the federal laboratory in Chem Service was
not a national park; (ii) the federal agency involved in Chem Service was the
EPA, whereas in Edmonds Institute it was the NPS; (iii) while the CRADA
entered into in Edmonds Institute related to future technologies derived from yet-
to-be-done research, the CRADAs in Chem Service included pre-existing
technologies; and (iv) the CRADA between the EPA and NSI Technology
Services Corporation challenged in Chem Service, while providing that the EPA
would receive part of the profits of the sale of reference materials, is different
from the profit-sharing provision in the CRADA challenged in Edmonds Institute
because of the scope and nature of the potential benefits. Chem Serv., 12 F.3d
at 1258-61; Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 4-6.
61 Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 5.
62 Id. at 9 (explaining that plaintiffs are: Edmonds Institute, a not-for-profit
public interest organization, the goals of which are, among others, "the regulation
of biotechnology and the maintenance and protection of biodiversity"; Alliance
for the Wild Rockies, a not-for-profit organization "dedicated to the preservation
and protection of the native biodiversity of the Northern Rockies Region";
International Center for Technology Assessment, a not-for-profit corporation
"focused on the environmental, economic, and ethical issues surrounding the
biotechnology industry"; and Phil Knight, a resident of Montana who likes to
"hike, photograph, and otherwise enjoy [the] aesthetic and recreational qualities
[of Yellowstone National Park]").
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CRADA with Diversa Corporation, the defendants63 violated the
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 ("FTTA"), 64 NPSOA,65
the Yellowstone National Park Organic Act,66 the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),67 the Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("APA"), 68 and the public trust doctrine. 69 After decid-
ing that the plaintiffs had standing to sue both under Article III of
the United States Constitution7 ° and under the "zone of interest"
63 Id. (stating that defendants are Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and
Director of NPS Robert Stanton, each sued only in his official capacity).
64 15 U.S.C. §§ 3710a-3710d (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See infra notes 173-
174 and accompanying text (noting the broad congressional purpose of fostering
technological cooperation between the federal government and the private sector
by encouraging technology transfers, thereby increasing the nation's competitive-
ness in that area).
65 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See supra notes 24, 27 and
accompanying text (noting that NPSOA provided the mandate for the creation
of the NPS and that NPSOA recognizes that the purpose of the national parks is
"to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations").
66 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-22 (1994) (establishing Yellowstone National Park by
defining its boundaries and recognizing that Yellowstone National Park "shall be
under the exclusive control of the Secretary of the Interior," who "shall make
regulations providing for the preservation, from injury or spoliation, of all timber,
mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders, within the park, and their
retention in their natural condition").
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See infra note 145 and
accompanying text (recognizing the implementation of NEPA as a result of the
public's awareness of the increasing damage done to the environment and the
need to take remedial action).
6' 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The APA allows
parties to bring a cause of action challenging interpretations of law and other
final agency actions alleged to be in violation of a statute. 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1994).
69 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the public trust doctrine and explaining
that under the public trust doctrine, the public's rights in certain natural resources
are enforced by the government acting as the trustee of a public trust).
70 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that "[tihe judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority"); Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10, 13 (D.D.C. 1999)
(noting that the courts have interpreted the authority granted the judiciary under
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requirement of the FITA,1 the court ordered the NPS to suspend
the implementation of the CRADA "pending the completion of any
and all review mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act,
including but not limited to the preparation of an Environmental
Assessment '72 or Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS").73
Article III to "impose a constitutional limitation on what persons or entities may
bring suit in federal court").
"' Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 14. Additionally, the court found that
plaintiffs had "stated a cause of action under the APA that the defendants have
acted in violation of the FTTA" and that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action
under NPSOA and the Yellowstone National Park Organic Act. Id. at 15-16.
However, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action
under the public trust doctrine. Id. at 16-17. See Chem Serv., Inc. v. Environ-
mental Monitoring Sys. Lab., 12 F.3d 1256, 1265 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining the
"zone of interest" requirement by noting that, although Congress did not
anywhere in the FITA "confer a right on private entities to bring suit to
challenge a CRADA," the United States Supreme Court "has recognized that
Congress does not need to specifically confer a right to bring suit for agency
disregard of the law" and that all the court must find is that "Congress intended
for entities possessing interests such as those of [the plaintiff] to be relied upon
to challenge the EPA's disregard for the law").
72 Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 20. An Environmental Assessment is
defined as a brief public document that: 1) provides "sufficient evidence and
analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement
or a finding of no significant impact;" 2) assists in "an agency's compliance with
[NEPA] when no environmental impact statement is necessary;" or 3) "[fjacili-
tate[s] preparation of a[n environmental impact] statement when one is
necessary." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1999). Following the court's decision, the NPS
announced that it would not appeal and would "immediately begin environmental
studies." Laceky, supra note 58.
13 Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 20. An EIS is:
[A] detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
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Governmental sharing of profits derived from commercial uses
of public natural resources has become more open and controver-
sial since the commercialization of Thermus aquaticus and Pacific
yew tree bark. In addition, the issue has now led to litigation, as
illustrated by Edmonds Institute. The intensified debate is due
partly to the lack of clarity of the existing statutory framework
regulating public lands, which is silent on whether profit-sharing is
an acceptable use of those lands. Although profit-sharing is gaining
attention, adequate legislation providing that profit-sharing should
be permitted has yet to be passed. The existing legislative and
judicial framework in various areas of the law must be examined
to determine whether some or all of that framework may be applied
to resolve the issue of profit-sharing.
II. THE EXISTING LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK
The issue of the federal government sharing the profits of the
commercialization of natural resources found on public lands with
private industry must be analyzed in view of existing legal
principles to determine whether any may be used to justify or
condemn profit-sharing. First, several constitutional arguments must
be considered in support of and against profit-sharing. Second,
profit-sharing must be analyzed in light of property law arguments,
including general property rights, the public trust doctrine, and the
doctrine of accession. Finally, compensation to the government also
must be analyzed in view of environmental law, more particularly
the purposes and requirements of NEPA.
A. Constitutional Law
Several constitutional issues present themselves when consider-
ing the legality of the government sharing in revenues generated by
private companies from resources found on public lands. While
these different constitutional doctrines may provide both justifica-
tions for and arguments against the validity of profit-sharing, other
legal principles may prove stronger for the respective sides. Even
so, the constitutional issues must be considered in brief.
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The Property Clause of the United States Constitution 74
provides the basis for an argument that the government has
authority over the management of federal public lands and
therefore can make any decisions affecting such lands, including
the decision to enter into a CRADA with a profit-sharing provi-
sion.75 Additionally, the Property Clause has been interpreted to
give the federal government authority to regulate activities that
"directly interfere with the management of public resources." 76
74 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (providing that "[tihe Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States").
" See Susan D. Baer, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine-A Tool to
Make Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection of Public Land and
Its Resources, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 385, 422-24 (1988). See also
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (holding that Congress had authority
to protect wildlife on public lands under the Property Clause), reh'g denied, 429
U.S. 873 (1976); United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting that "under the Property Clause, the United States can administer its
federal lands any way it chooses, including the establishment of a national forest
reserve"). Arguably, the court's conclusion in Gardner may provide support for
the concept that the Property Clause gives the federal government the authority
to enter into agreements including profit-sharing provisions, since establishing a
forest reserve, thereby protecting the environment, is analogous to receiving
profits that can be used for further preservation of genetic resources.
76 Maria E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons from Public
Land Law, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 43, 54-55 (1991). Even though this statement was
made in the context of governmental regulation of activities "undertaken on
private land surrounded by public land," the argument is even stronger in favor
of regulation of such activities occurring on public land. Id. at 55. See McGrail
v. Babbitt, 986 F. Supp. 1386, 1394 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("'Congress clearly has the
power to dedicate federal land for particular purposes. As a necessary incident
of that power, Congress must have the ability to insure that these lands be
protected against interference with their intended purposes."' (quoting Minnesota
v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981))). Illustrating the principle that the
federal government has the power under the Property Clause to regulate both
federal lands and non-federal property adjacent thereto in order to achieve the
designated purpose of federal lands, the court in McGrail went on to find that the
FWS had the authority to regulate the activities of a private boat-chartering
company "through state-owned waters to federally-owned [land]." Id. at 1394-95.
See also Klump v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 243, 248 (1997) (stating that the
Property Clause gives Congress the power "to control the occupancy and use of
public land and to protect that land from trespass and injury" (citing Kleppe v.
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Under this rationale, the Property Clause can be invoked to
authorize federal land management agencies to enter into agree-
ments providing for profit-sharing, since permitting private
companies to use federal land natural resources without receiving
any of the profits derived therefrom would be equal to an interfer-
ence with the management of such resources.
One might also argue that the use of public lands without
compensation to the landowner, the United States, constitutes a
"taking" in violation of the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution.77 This argument, however, seems invalid because
public lands are by definition not "private property ' 78 and,
therefore, their use without compensating the federal government
does not constitute a "taking." Even though recent United States
Supreme Court cases have evidenced a trend that environmental
land-use regulations by the government require compensation under
the Fifth Amendment,79 the argument has not been extended to
regulations by the government of its own lands.
A constitutional argument opposing profit-sharing could be
made that, by entering into CRADAs with some corporations and
not others, federal agencies such as the NPS violate a private user's
constitutional right to equal access to natural resources and equal
treatment. A similar argument was unsuccessful8" and it is not
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976))).
77 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing, in part, that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation").
78 Private property is defined as property "over which the owner has
exclusive and absolute rights." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (7th ed. 1999).
71 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395-96 (1994) (holding
that certain conditions imposed by the city in return for granting a building
permit violated the Takings Clause); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (holding that when a state's anti-erosion law
restricting construction in a coastal zone denies a landowner "all economically
productive or beneficial uses of [his] land," a taking has occurred and therefore
compensation is required).
go See Eiseman v. Andrus, 433 F. Supp. 1103, 1106-07 (D. Ariz. 1977),
aff'd, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980)
(concluding that the NPS's "allocation of usage" of the Colorado river has a
"rational basis .... furthers the legitimate governmental objective of providing
for the greatest possible public enjoyment of the river experience subject to
ecological, environmental and public safety limitations," and does not violate the
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clear from this precedent alone whether such argument may prevail
in the future. When an equal protection argument was raised in
objection to the different treatment accorded commercial and non-
commercial users of the Colorado river, a district court found a
rational basis for treating the two classes of users differently.8
Similarly, another district court held that an individual's constitu-
tional rights to travel and to equal protection were not violated by
Forest Service regulations limiting travel on an unpaved forest
development road through a national forest as a means of protect-
ing national resources.82 Thus, such constitutional arguments in
opposition to profit-sharing seem likely to fail.
B. Property Law
Because natural resources found on public lands arguably are
owned either by the federal government83 or by the public,
84
sharing the profits derived from their use necessarily raises
property law issues. The issue of profit-sharing may be explored in
light of general property rights inherent in land ownership. In
addition, the public trust doctrine may be considered to resolve the
issue of profit-sharing. Finally, profit-sharing may be analyzed
under the doctrine of accession to decide whether the government
may acquire title to products derived from natural resources found
on public lands.
constitutional rights of the users of the river); Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Espy, 833 F. Supp. 808, 815-16, 821 (D. Idaho 1993) (concluding that plaintiffs'
"constitutional right to travel" and right to equal protection were not violated by
Forest Service restrictions on forest road traffic, and that the Constitution
provides "no express right to travel").
8' Eiseman, 433 F. Supp. at 1107.
82 Mountain States Legal Found., 833 F. Supp. at 821.
83 See infra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the status of the
federal government as a proprietor of public lands).
84See infra notes 121-122 and accompanying text (discussing the rights
possessed by the public in certain natural resources).
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1. Property Rights in General
Many rights flow from property ownership." A landowner, for
example, has the right to use her land, 6 to exclude others from
her land,87 to sell, donate, bequeath or otherwise convey her land
85 See generally United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378
(1945) (describing property rights as the rights "to possess, use and dispose of
[property]"); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509 (Mosk,
J., dissenting) (describing the "'bundle of [property] rights"' as the rights "to
possess the property, to use the property, to exclude others from the property,
and to dispose of the property by sale or by gift" (citing Union Oil Co. v. State
Bd. of Equal., 386 P.2d 496 (Cal. 1963))).
86 See, e.g., Reaver v. Martin Theatres of Fla., 52 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla.
1951) (stating that "a property owner may put his own property to any
reasonable and lawful use" provided that he does not "deprive the adjoining
landowner of any right of enjoyment of his property which is recognized and
protected by law" and that his use of his property does not amount to a
nuisance); Allen v. McClellan, 405 P.2d 405, 407-08 (N.M. 1965) (recognizing
the right of a landowner to hunt game on his own land); Jones v. Wagner, 624
A.2d 166, 168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (pointing out the long-recognized principle
that "the landowner has the exclusive right to the space above the surface of his
property"); Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 194 (Wis. 1982) (Callow, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging the existence of policies "favoring the right of a
landowner to use his property as he lawfully desires" and stating that "[t]he right
of a property owner to lawful enjoyment of his property should be vigorously
protected").
87 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421-
22, 435 (1982) (stating that the "power to exclude has traditionally been
considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property
rights" and holding that the installation of a television cable on parts of the roof
and side of plaintiff's building constituted a taking, despite the fact that the cable
was "less than one-half inch in diameter and ... approximately 30 feet in
length"). See also Blackstone's description of the right to exclude others:
For the right of meum and tuum, or property, in lands once established,
it follows as a necessary consequence, that this right must be exclusive;
that is, that the owner may retain to himself the sole use and occupa-
tion of his soil: every entry therefore thereon without the owner's
leave, and especially if contrary to his express order, is a trespass or
transgression.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209.
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to others,8 and to derive profits from the use of her land.89 The
issue of profits derived from use of a landowner's property has
been litigated extensively, particularly in the area of mineral
resources.9° Courts have held not only that landowners have the
right to derive such profits, but also that they have the right to use
resources found underneath their land.9' Such judicial precedent
s See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d 551,
562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Cope, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the trial
court's finding that the plaintiffs "'right to alienate, transfer, use and convey its
property"' had been unreasonably and illegally restricted, resulting in the
restriction being "'void ab initio and of no further force and effect"'); Robertson
v. Simmons, 322 S.W.2d 476, 481 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959) (noting that at common
law, "all restraints on the alienation of land held in fee were void" and that the
rule prevailing in Kentucky was that a restriction on alienation was allowed if
it was for a "reasonable" period of time); Moffit v. Sederlund, 378 N.W.2d 491,
498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that when "one's interest in property is
absolute, as a fee simple, restriction on his right of alienation is void as
repugnant to the grant"); Brace v. Black, 144 A.2d 385, 389-90 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1958) (noting the "well-recognized policy of freedom of alienation of
property" and the "strong public policy in favor of the free transferability of
property"); Solberg v. Heeb, No. 17910-9-III, 1999 WL 982390, at *2 (Wash.
Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1999) (noting that "[a] property owner may dedicate, donate
or grant a portion of its land to the public or an individual").
89 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Gadsden, 584 So. 2d 796, 797-98 (Ala. 1991)
(recognizing a city's right, as landowner, to use its land for commercial purposes
and to derive a profit therefrom, even though there was sufficient evidence that
the city did not intend to derive a profit from the use of its park); Minard Run
Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Co., 214 A.2d 234, 235 (Pa. 1965) (stating that a landowner
who had sold a pipeline easement to his land retained the right "to use the rest
of [his] land in a manner profitable to [his] own business" and could not be
prevented "from working his land so as to derive the greatest profit therefrom").
90 See, e.g., In re Senior-G & A Operating Co., 957 F.2d 1290, 1296 (5th
Cir. 1992) (stating that, "[u]nder Louisiana law, the landowner has the right to
explore and develop mineral resources under his land"); In re Hillsborough
Holdings Corp., 207 B.R. 299, 303 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (noting that "the
right held by the landowner is 'the right to reduce the oil and gas to possession
or to sever this right for economic consideration' (quoting NCNB Texas Nat'l
Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So. 2d 212, 223 (Ala. 1993))).
91 See, e.g., In re Hillsborough, 207 B.R. at 303; NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank,
631 So. 2d at 223; Union Gas Sys. v. Carnahan, 774 P.2d 962, 967 (Kan. 1989)
(stating that "landowners ha[ve] the right to recover and keep injected gas which
had moved under the landowners' property" (citing Anderson v. Beech Aircraft
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may be used to resolve the issue of governmental profit-sharing
with respect to commercial exploitation of natural resources found
on public lands because the federal government may be considered
the owner of federal lands92 and, therefore, the holder of a right
to use the natural resources found thereon and to derive profits
from such use.93
A counter-argument may be raised, however, that once the
federal government agrees to dispose of some of the natural
resources found on its lands, for example by allowing biotechnolo-
gy companies to collect specimens, the government loses its rights
Corp., 699 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1985))); Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co.,
898 P.2d 680, 688-89 (Mont. 1995) (stating that "petroleum and gas, as long as
they remain in the ground, are a part of the realty .... belong to the owner of
the land, and are a part of it as long as they are on it or in it, or subject to [the
landowner's] control"); Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conser-
vation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1996) (noting that "[hlistorically,
landowners have had property rights in the water beneath their land").
92 See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) (stating that
"Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the
public domain"); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (emphasizing
the federal government's ownership of public lands by noting that Congress
"'may deal with [its] lands precisely as a private individual may deal with his
farming property ... [and] may sell or withhold them from sale"' (quoting
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897))); Fort Leavenworth R.R.
v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 526 (1885) (analogizing the United States as a
"proprietor" with respect to public lands); United States v. Nye County, 920 F.
Supp. 1108, 1120 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that "the United States owns and has
the power and authority to manage and administer the unappropriated public
lands.. . within Nye County, Nevada"); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Espy,
833 F. Supp. 808, 816 (D. Idaho 1993) (stating that "as a landowner, the United
States, through its Forest Service, has the right to regulate when and under what
circumstances the public may enter and use national forest lands so as to protect
those lands and the resources found there").
13 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 517 (Cal. 1990)
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "[s]ocietal notions of equity and fairness
demand recognition of property rights" and that "[t]o deny the person contribut-
ing the raw material a fair share of the benefits [derived from human biologics]
is both unfair and morally wrong"). Arguably, natural resources may be
analogized to the human body for purposes of this unjust enrichment argument
because, as an individual's body provides the raw materials necessary to medical
research, public lands provide the raw materials necessary to scientific research
and potential development of commercially valuable products.
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to such resources and, therefore, is not entitled to any profits
derived from commercial application of those resources. A similar
argument was made in Moore v. Regents of the University of
California,94 though it is unlikely that the argument would prevail
in the context of ownership of public lands as the "property"
involved in Moore was body parts. 95
In Moore, the plaintiff's body parts consisted of cells taken
from his blood and other bodily substances.' The plaintiff was
diagnosed with hairy-cell leukemia and consented to having his
spleen removed upon his physician's assurance that the operation
was necessary to "slow down the progress of [the] disease." 97
Before Moore's spleen was removed, his physician realized that his
blood contained certain substances likely to be of high commercial
value.98 Upon this discovery, and without informing Moore, the
physician made arrangements to have access to Moore's spleen
once removed.99 Moore's physician, assisted by other parties, then
developed an extremely valuable cell line from the cells taken from
Moore's spleen and from the withdrawal of Moore's blood, bone
marrow aspirate, and other bodily substances over a period of
several years after the operation."0 Moore was never informed of
the commercial applications derived from his cells.101 A pat-
ent 1 2 was subsequently issued for the cell line developed from
94 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). Moore alleged that he still owned his cells after
their removal and that he had a proprietary interest in any commercial
applications derived from his cells. Id. at 487. The Supreme Court of California
held that Moore did not retain either possession of, or an ownership interest in,
his cells after their removal and, therefore, could not sustain either a cause of
action for conversion or a proprietary claim in the products derived from his
cells. Id. at 488-89.
9' Moore, 793 P.2d at 485.
96 id.





" See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West 2000) (providing that a patent is a
privilege granted by the government to an inventor, allowing such inventor "to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention" for
which a patent was granted).
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Moore's cells, bestowing enormous benefits to its inventors,
without any part thereof allocated to Moore. 3 Moore then
unsuccessfully filed a lawsuit seeking a share of the profits.)°4
Ownership and commercialization of human body parts is a
highly controversial issue that has not yet been resolved. °5 The
controversy stems from the fear that, if body parts are deemed to
be personal property, thereby giving their owners the right to use
them in a commercial manner, a tidal wave may ensue whereby
103 Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
104 Id. at 482-83.
'05 Id. at 498 (Arabian, J., concurring). Justice Arabian recognized that the
moral, philosophical, and religious implications of "recognizing and enforcing a
property interest in body tissues are not known, but are greatly feared." Id.
Additionally, in his concurrence and dissent, Justice Broussard recognized that
allowing an individual or private entity to profit from human body parts is
problematic and that, "as a matter of policy or morality, it would be wiser to
prohibit [commercial uses] of a human body" but noted that creating a system
that would allow such uses "for the betterment of society as a whole" is better
left to the Legislature. Id. at 505 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). See
National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e (1994 & Supp. III 1997)
(prohibiting the sale of "human organs," including "kidney, liver, heart, lung,
pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof' and
"any other human organ," but not including replenishable tissues such as blood
and cells); United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing
a tangible property interest in blood plasma); People v. Young, 248 N.Y.S.2d
287, 298 (Westchester County Ct. 1964) (stating that the defendant's blood,
which had been obtained through an illegal search and seizure, was his property).
See also Helen R. Bergman, Note and Comment, Case Comment: Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 127, 135-36 (1992)
(recognizing the existence of and limitations on "property-like interests in the
human body" by pointing out that "individuals appear to have a property interest
in certain body by-products" such as semen and blood, which can be sold);
Stephen R. Munzer, The Special Case of Property Rights in Umbilical Cord
Blood For Transplantation, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 493, 509-10 (1999) (stating
that, although "much controversy exists on whether anyone has property rights
in his or her own body or body parts, or in the bodies or body parts of others,"
it may be assumed that "at least sometimes some persons have some property
rights in some body parts"); Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination
of Property Law and Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167, 1246 (1995)
(noting that traditionally "[t]he human body and human health have not ... been
considered property").
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individuals, attracted by financial reward,' may sell their body
parts without regard for any moral, ethical, philosophical, or
religious concerns. °7 Another possible negative consequence of
recognizing an individual's ownership interest in his or her own
body parts and of allowing such individual to prevent the scientific
community from commercializing them without compensation is
the potential hindrance of medical research due to "restrict[ed]
access to the necessary raw materials"10 8 or to the possible
"destruction of the researcher's incentive to search." 1°9 On the
other hand, denying an individual a property interest in his or her
own body and allowing third parties to exploit one's cells freely is
106 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 498 (Cal. 1990)
(Arabian, J., concurring) (mentioning, among other possible effects of allowing
an individual to commercialize his or her own body parts, the "development of
competitive bidding for such [commercialized body parts]"). See Munzer, supra
note 105, at 538 (noting that "[v]irtually all people cringe when they read of a
poor man in India who sells one of his kidneys to have enough money for his
family"); Brian G. Hannemann, Comment, Body Parts and Property Rights: A
New Commodity for the 1990s, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 399, 420 (1993) (giving the
example of a desperate father selling his son's kidney for $10,000 in order to
"provide food and shelter for his family").
'o7 Moore, 793 P.2d at 498 (Arabian, J., concurring). See Munzer, supra note
105, at 539 (suggesting that it may be "morally objectionable to sell body parts
if it offends human dignity to transfer them for a reason that is not strong enough
in light of the nature of the parts sold"); Bergman, supra note 105, at 139 (noting
the existence of "significant ideological reasons for prohibiting [persons whose
tissues are used] from sharing in commercial profits," including the possibility
that "economically disadvantaged people will be compelled to sell organs and
tissue simply for the profit involved").
10m Moore, 793 P.2d at 494 (explaining the critical role played by human
cells in medical research).
109 Robert Heidt, Maintaining Incentives for Bioprospecting: The Occasional
Need for a Right to Lie, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 670, 672 (1998)
(generally arguing for a researcher's right to lie to patients or study subjects
about the value of their cells and against compensating them for the use of such
cells, and specifically explaining that such compensation, by "undermining the
incentive to search," would result in a loss to the scientific community and
therefore to society).
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a sign of disrespect to the human being as an individual and may
be analogized to slavery. °
Even though the plaintiff in Moore lost the argument that he
had a property interest in his cells and, therefore, was entitled to a
share of the profits derived from their commercial exploitation,III
this does not suggest that the government has no proprietary
interest in the natural resources found on public lands. Commercial-
ization of removed body parts as raised in Moore and that of
natural resources removed from government lands may be distin-
guished on several grounds. First, it is easier to recognize a
proprietary interest in wild genetic resources found on federal
lands'12 than it is to do so in removed body parts. 113 Second,
even assuming one has a property right in one's body parts or cells,
disposing of the property as a result of a medical procedure is
different from the government authorizing private entities to collect
specimens on public lands. In most instances, specimens collected
are not from resources disposed of by the government, but attached
to public lands. 114 The use of medically extracted body parts,
"o Moore, 793 P.2d at 515 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (noting societal recognition
of the human body and the policy and ethical considerations leading to the
prohibition of "direct abuse of the body by torture or other forms of cruel or
unusual punishment" as well as "indirect abuse of the body by its economic
exploitation for the sole benefit of another person"). In his dissent, Justice Mosk
alleges that the specter of slavery is raised in today's research laboratories, where
scientists claim "the right to appropriate and exploit a patient's tissue for their
sole economic benefit-the right, in other words, to freely mine or harvest
valuable physical properties of the patient's body." Id. at 515-16. See Bergman,
supra note 105, at 136 (stating that "[silavery was the most far-reaching property
right in human bodies ever recognized").
... Moore, 793 P.2d at 497 (holding that plaintiff does not have a cause of
action for conversion).
112 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the status of the
federal government as a proprietor of public lands).
113 Moore, 793 P.2d at 487-89 (stating that no court had ever "imposed
conversion liability for the use of human cells in medical research," that a cause
of action for conversion required either title to or possession of the allegedly
converted property, and that no cases have held "that a person retains a sufficient
interest in excised cells to support a cause of action for conversion").
"4 See supra Part I.B (discussing commercial products derived directly from
samples collected in national parks or bark removed from national forest trees).
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however, occurs after they have been removed from the body as
they are no longer necessary or useful to the patient."5 Finally,
unlike ownership of body parts, ownership of natural resources
found on public lands does not involve such highly controversial
moral, ethical, and philosophical dilemmas.
2. Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine relies on the concept that the govern-
ment is a "trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the peo-
ple"' 1 6 and, as trustee, has the obligation to ensure that the
public's interest in natural resources is protected. 7 In Edmonds
Institute, the court found that plaintiffs had not stated a cause of
action under the public trust doctrine" 8 because "Congress had
supplanted any trust obligations by enacting the detailed regulatory
system governing the national parks.""..9 However, this doctrine
"5 Moore, 793 P.2d at 491-92 (pointing out statutory limits to a "patient's
control over excised cells" and requirements that human body parts, tissues, and
other remains be disposed of after being used for scientific purposes, thereby
inferring that cells and body parts are no longer useful to a patient once extracted
from the body).
116 National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal.
1983) (quoting Colberg, Inc. v. California ex rel. Dept. Pub. Works, 432 P.2d 3
(Cal. 1967)).
17 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-54 (1892)
(stating that the state, as trustee of lands under navigable waters, had the duty to
protect the people's interest in such lands and, therefore, was not authorized to
remove them fully from its direction and control). See also National Audubon
Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 724 (supporting the very significant role played by the state
as trustee):
[Tihe public trust is more than an affmnation of state power to use
public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of
the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes,
marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in
rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purposes of the trust.
Id.
"8 Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16-17 (D.D.C. 1999).
19 Id. at 17 (citing Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C.
1980)).
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is still recognized by some courts as a property rights doctrine. 2°
20 Even though many of the judicial decisions applying the public trust
doctrine recognize the state as the trustee of public lands, some courts have also
applied the doctrine to the federal government. See, e.g., Idaho Sporting
Congress, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 92 F.3d 922, 924, 928 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that the U.S. Forest Service did not violate the public trust
doctrine when it developed forest projects including salvage timber sales in
response to a series of destructive wildfires); National Ass'n of Home Builders
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 357-58 (D.N.J.
1999) (applying the doctrine to the state of New Jersey and recognizing that title
to public trust property, i.e., property "which was submerged under the Hudson
River, was artificially filled in, and upon which [a waterfront] [w]alkway [is
required by the state to be] built," and is subject "to the public's right to use and
enjoy the property, even if such property is alienated to private owners" as the
"right of the public to use and enjoy. . . 'public trust lands' does not disappear
simply because the land that was once submerged is filled in"); United States v.
Burlington N. R.R. Co., 710 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (D. Neb. 1989) (holding that
under the public trust doctrine, the United States, similar to an individual state,
could "maintain an action to recover for damages to its public lands and the
natural resources on them"); United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp.
120, 125 (D. Mass. 1981) (concluding that, similar to the state of Massachusetts,
the federal government is restricted, under the public trust doctrine, "in its ability
to abdicate to private individuals its [sovereignty] in the land"); In re Steuart
Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (holding that "[u]nder the
public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United States have the right
and the duty to protect and preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife
resources"); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal.
1983) (concluding that "[tihe state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust
into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect
public trust uses whenever feasible"); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 358, 368-69 (N.J. 1984) (noting that the public trust
doctrine, originally recognizing that "the ownership, dominion and sovereignty
over land flowed by tidal waters, which extend to the mean high water mark, is
vested in the State in trust for the people," has been extended to dry sand beach
areas (citing Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J.
1972)) and holding that the public has a right to use and access New Jersey's
shoreline areas under the public trust doctrine); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North
Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 460, 462 (N.D.
1976) (holding that the "discretionary authority of state officials to allocate vital
state resources is not without limit but is circumscribed by [the public trust
doctrine]" which requires, at a minimum, "a determination of the potential effect
of the allocation of water on the present water supply and future water needs of
[the state]"). See also Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and
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As one commentator noted, the public trust doctrine is based on the
notion "that the public possesses inviolable rights in certain natural
resources" 121 and was established as a public property regime to
resist "the exercise of private property rights in natural resources
deemed contrary to the public interest."
1 22
Even though the implementation of an increasing number of
environmental protection laws 123 in recent years has led to the
decline of the concept underlying the doctrine, 124 courts since
1970 have allowed some private citizens to "maintain actions
against governmental and private parties to vindicate public trust
doctrine interests."1 25 Additionally, although the public trust
doctrine originally applied solely to water resources, 26 it was
Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71
IOWA L. REv. 631, 643-44 (1986) (discussing the impact of the public trust
doctrine "on litigation brought by parties on behalf of natural resource
protection" since 1970).
121 Lazarus, supra note 120, at 632.
122 Lazarus, supra note 120, at 633.
123 See, e.g., NEPA, codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994 & Supp. III
1997) (requiring that federal agencies comply with certain provisions before
undertaking any action that may have an impact on the environment, thereby
embodying the same concept of agency accountability to the public as that in the
public trust doctrine); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994) (furthering that
concept by allowing private suits against federal agencies for failure to comply
with statutory provisions); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(1994) (allowing "citizen suits" against private parties and governmental agencies
for violation of the statute).
i24 Lazarus, supra note 120, at 633.
125 Lazarus, supra note 120, at 646. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y, 658
P.2d at 728, 732 (noting that statutes enacted to codify the concept of public trust
uses have not rendered the doctrine superfluous, reaffirming the importance of
the doctrine, and holding that the plaintiffs can rely on the doctrine in challeng-
ing the allocation of water from a state lake); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,
381-82 (Cal. 1971) (allowing an individual to request judicial recognition of a
public trust easement on the property of another individual and recognizing
different actions that members of the public have been allowed to bring under
the public trust doctrine); Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 263
N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ill. 1970) (recognizing that members of the public, being the
beneficiaries of the "public trust," must have "the right and standing to enforce
[the public trust]").
126 Lazarus, supra note 120, at 647.
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later extended to other resources.'27 Despite this judicial expan-
sion of the doctrine, it has diminished in strength in the context of
environmental protection due to the government's increased
authority over environmental matters, 128 the implementation of
environmental and natural resources statutes, 129 and the active
role now played by federal agencies in environmental protection
and conservation. 3 ° In light of the diminished authority of the
public trust doctrine and its replacement by better means of
127 Lazarus, supra note 120, at 649 (giving as examples beaches, rural
parklands, historic battlefields, wildlife, archaeological remains, and downtown
areas). See also In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980)
(applying the public trust doctrine to the protection of migratory waterfowl);
National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 712 (recognizing that the public trust
"protects environmental and recreational values" (citing Marks v. Whitney, 491
P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971))); People v. Harbor Hut Restaurant, 196 Cal. Rptr. 7, 8 (Ct.
App. 1983) (extending the doctrine to the protection of sport-caught fish); Gould
v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966) (applying the
doctrine to the protection of parkland); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 93 (Pa.
1973) (applying the public trust concept to "the management of public natural
resources," including "clean air, pure water, and ... natural, scenic, historic, and
esthetic values of the environment").
128 Lazarus, supra note 120, at 665-69, 674 (analyzing how the "expansion
of police power authority" over environmental matters and the "erosion of private
property" in the face of such authority have eroded the use of the public trust
doctrine in the prevention of environmental harm). See also Conservation Law
Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1480 n.8 (D. Mass. 1984) (stating that, even
though the Secretary of the Interior had a public trust duty to stop off-road
vehicle use on Cape Cod National Seashore lands, further consideration of the
public trust doctrine was unnecessary in light of the existence of congressional
and executive mandates protecting the Seashore).
129 Lazarus, supra note 120, at 685-86 (giving as an example of such statutes
NEPA, which "requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts
of proposed actions, which include issuing federal permits, spending federal
funds, and managing vast federal properties, prior to taking any such action").
130 Lazarus, supra note 120, at 688-91 (noting that federal administrative
agencies such as the EPA and the FWS, "whose primary mandates are to prevent
needless environmental degradation and to maintain a healthy environment," are
major players in the management of environmental matters). But see Baer, supra
note 75, at 387 (supporting the proposition that, "although the public trust
doctrine is not currently an effective tool in forcing federal agency protection of
natural resources, it has the potential to be one upon some initiative by the
judiciary and future plaintiffs").
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enforcement, the doctrine seems inappropriate to resolve the novel
issue of governmental profit-sharing of revenues derived from
natural resources found on its lands.
3. Doctrine of Accession
Accession has been defined as a common-law doctrine whereby
"the owner of property gets title to everything his property
produces, or that is attached to it, either naturally or artificial-
ly."' 131 Courts in various jurisdictions have applied this doctrine
to numerous kinds of chattels, such as computer equipment,'32
paint used on buildings,1 33 parts of a van, 34 and automobile
engines. 3 Courts have established two major inquiries in their
determination of who owns title to property under the doctrine of
accession. 136
First, courts have analyzed title to property where one owner's
original property becomes new property as a result of skill or labor
131 Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE
L.J. 1855, 1887 (1985). The doctrine of accession includes: "the addition to real
property produced by the gradual deposit of solid matter by running water"; "the
acquisition by the landholder of personal property immovably attached to [the
chattel]"; "the right of an owner of a female domestic animal to its [offspring]";
and "the right of the owner of property to its income." Id. Another similar
definition provides that the doctrine of accession signifies "the acquisition of tile
to personal property by its conversion into an entirely different thing by labor
bestowed on it or by its incorporation into a union with other property." 1 AM.
JUR. 2D Accession and Confusion § 1 (1994).
132 See Computer Sys. of Am. v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 975 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.
1992).
133 See Fanderlick-Locke Co. v. United States ex rel. Morgan, 285 F.2d 939
(10th Cir. 1960).
134 See Bank of Am. v. J. & S. Auto Repairs, 694 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1985).
131 See Havas Used Cars, Inc. v. Lundy, 276 P.2d 727 (Nev. 1954).
136 See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Accession and Confusion § 1 (1994) (stating that, "[i]f
materials of one person are combined or united with the materials of another by
skill and labor, forming a single, joint product, the owner of the principal
materials which go to make up the whole acquires by accession the right of
property in the whole" whereas "a claim of title by accession where materials of
another are united may be defeated if such materials can be identified and
severed without injury to the original property").
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brought by a third party.'37 This means that if a party owns a
piece of property and that property is later altered or improved by
another's skill or labor, the owner of the original property also
becomes the owner of the end property. 3 8 Courts in such cases
have found that title to the end product passes to the owner of the
principal piece of property after some items of lesser importance
have been added to the principal piece.'39 Second, courts have
looked into whether the chattels that have been added to a principal
piece of property may be removed or detached from the principal
piece without causing injury thereto.' 4 If the answer to this
inquiry is affirmative, courts have held that the added goods have
not become part of the original piece of property and, therefore, the




139 See, e.g., In re Amereco Envtl. Servs., 138 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1992) (holding that storage tank owner gained title to catwalks and ladders
welded to the tanks); Mossier Acceptance Co. v. Norton Tire Co., 70 So. 2d 360,
361 (Fla. 1954) (stating that ordinary repairs upon personal property merge into
the principal piece of property and the owner of the principal piece thereby
acquires title to the new property after repairs); Capitol Chevrolet Co. v.
Earheart, 627 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a buyer who
had purchased in good faith stripped-down hulls of stolen automobiles and
thereafter used his own labor and materials to reconstruct vehicles acquired title
to such vehicles); Ralston Purina Co. v. Toycen Motors, 124 N.W.2d 24, 27
(Wis. 1963) (noting that when the chattels of two different owners are
incorporated together, title to the resulting piece of property is vested in the
owner of the principal chattels).
140 1 AM. JUR. 2D Accession and Confusion § 1 (1994).
141 See, e.g., Rabtoay Gen. Tire Co. v. Colorado Kenworth Corp., 309 P.2d
616, 621 (Colo. 1957) (holding that title is not acquired by accession in the case
of vehicle equipment when the equipment is distinguishable from the vehicle and
may be detached therefrom without any damage resulting thereto); Omaha Std.,
Inc. v. Nissen, 187 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Iowa 1971) (holding that title was not
acquired by accession where the body and accessories of a truck could be
removed from the truck without any resulting injury thereto); Havas Used Cars,
Inc. v. Lundy, 276 P.2d 727, 728 (Nev. 1954) (holding that an automobile engine
had not become part of the vehicle when it could have been removed without
damaging the vehicle and, therefore, the vehicle owner did not have title to the
engine); Olive's Store v. Thomas, 294 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. 1956) (holding that
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While the doctrine of accession applies mostly to personal
property, as opposed to real property,'42 one can draw an analogy
between personal and real property and argue that, when an
element such as real or personal property is added to a principal
piece of real property, for example public lands, and the combina-
tion of the two results in a completely different piece of property,
title to the whole is vested in the owner of the principal piece. This
principle can be applied to the issue of profit-sharing in commer-
cial applications of natural resources found on public lands. Thus,
one can argue that, where the federal government owns the
principal piece, i.e., the national parks and all natural resources
found therein, and a third party, i.e., a private corporation, collects
specimens therefrom to which it adds its own skill and labor, the
federal government acquires title to the resulting product, i.e., a
pharmaceutical or agricultural product, and is entitled to proceeds
from any benefits derived from the end product. Additionally, one
can argue that removing the added skill or labor from the principal
piece of property would be either impossible or would result in
damage to the original piece and, therefore, the exception to the
doctrine of accession does not apply. 43
This analogy between the doctrine of accession as it is applied
to personal property and the doctrine as it may be applied to real
property results in a strong argument in favor of profit-sharing by
federal land management agencies. However, the courts to date
the doctrine of accession did not apply to tires placed on vehicles on the basis
that the tires could be removed from the vehicles without causing any damage
thereto).
142 Personal property is defined as "[a]ny movable or intangible thing that
is subject to ownership and not classified as real property." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1233 (7th ed. 1999). Real property is defined as "[l]and and
anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that may
be severed without injury to the land." Id. at 1234. Accession generally signifies
"acquisition of title to personal property by bestowing labor on a raw material
to convert it to another thing" or "[a]n improvement to existing personal
property." Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
143 See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text (explaining that the
exception lies in the fact that title is not acquired by accession where the added
chattels are identifiable from the original property and may be removed
therefrom without injury thereto).
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have yet to consider the doctrine of accession in this light, and thus
it is unlikely that the doctrine of accession could be used success-
fully in resolving the issue of profit-sharing.
C. Environmental Law: the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") 44
was implemented as a means of protecting the environment in an
era when both the public and legislators became conscious of its
importance and of the increasing damage being inflicted on the
environment. 145 NEPA requires that each federal land manage-
ment agency 46 comply with certain requirements whenever the
agency makes a decision concerning the public lands it manag-
es.14 7 Specifically, NEPA requires each agency to prepare an
144 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
145 See, e.g., Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primer on an 'Old' Law with
Solutions to New Problems, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10060, 10060 (1989) (noting that
NEPA was "[a] product of the growing environmental consciousness of
American society during the 1960s" and was "Congress' first modem environ-
mental law"); Paul S. Weiland, Amending the National Environmental Policy
Act: Federal Environmental Protection in the Twenty-first Century, 12 J. LAND
USE & ENvTL. L. 275, 275-76 (1997) (noting that the public "began to recognize
the adverse impact of humanity on the environment" after World War H and
pointing out a "rise in consciousness [that] catapulted the issue of environment
into the national arena").
"6 The four federal land management agencies are: the BLM, the NPS, the
Forest Service, and the FWS. Mansfield, supra note 16, at 831-48; Heisel, supra
note 19, at 236-37.
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (stating the purposes of
NEPA):
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources




EIS148 with each proposal "for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment." 49 One of the goals that NEPA seeks to achieve is bio-
diversity protection, 5 ' as illustrated by regulations enacted by the
Council on Environmental Quality, which require federal land
management agencies to "report impacts on ecosystems, including
'effects on natural resources and on the components, structures, and
functioning of affected ecosystems' in an EIS."'' The role
played by NEPA in the conservation and protection of biodiversity,
however, is limited as a result of NEPA requirements having been
interpreted by the courts as solely procedural.'52 Additionally,
even though the requirements of NEPA are subject to judicial
review, "courts have not consistently required federal agencies to
prepare full EISs before taking action [with respect to noninterven-
tion, conservation, or restoration of biodiversity].' 53 Specifically,
the general conservation policy enacted by the NPS has not been
subject to compliance with NEPA's procedural requirements and
therefore has not been scrutinized by the courts.'54
148 See supra note 73 (giving NEPA's definition of an EIS).
149 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
150 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1,
15-16 (1997) (stating that NEPA is an "important piece[ ] of the biodiversity
conservation policy puzzle" and that, although it "neither constitute[s] nor
require[s] a broad biodiversity strategy" in its current form, "[b]iodiversity
considerations are clearly within [its] ambit").
'5' Id. at 16 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1996)).
152Id. at 16. See Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 n.12
(D.D.C. 1999) (noting that the court itself recognized that it was concerned
"solely with enforcing the procedural requirements of the NEPA" and that,
because debates as to substantive environmental issues are better addressed by
the legislature than by the judiciary, the court's role is "merely to ensure that the
[federal land management] agencies act through the processes mandated by
Congress in reaching their substantive determinations"). The court explained that
it was only concerned with the procedural requirements because the issue of the
"substantive validity of bioprospecting as a natural resource management
strategy" is "one of considerable debate among and within many groups,
including environmentalists and park enthusiasts." Id.
... Keiter, supra note 23, at 680.
" Keiter, supra note 23, at 680 (stating specifically that the NPS's 1988
Management Policies document "was not prepared under NEPA procedures" and
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The shortcomings in the nature of NEPA's requirements and in
their interpretation by the courts weaken the positive impact that
NEPA may have on biodiversity policies and thus require the
implementation of additional legislation to protect the environment.
Additionally, NEPA itself is silent on the issue of profit-sharing by
federal land management agencies, even though profit-sharing is
one method of ensuring the conservation and protection of
biodiversity. Therefore, NEPA cannot be used to resolve the issue
of profit-sharing raised in Edmonds Institute.'55
The legal doctrines established in the areas of constitutional,
property, and environmental law are neither adequate nor sufficient
to resolve the issue of profit-sharing. In response, one must look
beyond them and further analyze the issue to determine how to
address it outside the existing legislative and judicial framework.
Before concluding that a new framework is needed, it is first
essential to establish the importance of profit-sharing. It is then
necessary to explore why new legislation specifically addressing
the issue of profit-sharing must be enacted.
III. THE NEED FOR NEW LEGISLATION
The principle of profit-sharing has been successfully imple-
mented at an international level and, thus, should be engaged in by
the United States.156 The existing legislative and judicial frame-
work in America is insufficient to ensure consistent governmental
profit-sharing in the future to the benefit of the government and the
public. New legislation addressing the issue is necessary. In order
to explain why profit-sharing is an important issue worthy of
specific legislation, it is essential to examine how it became an
international concern and what steps have been taken to address it.
It is also necessary to explore the benefits that would result from
profit-sharing both to the public and the environment. Analyzing
therefore "escaped the harsh glare of public scrutiny that accompanies NEPA
disclosures [and was] effectively insulated from judicial review").
155 42 F. Supp. 2d at 19-20.
156 See infra note 168 and accompanying text (explaining various policies
implemented by foreign countries in order for the governments of those countries
to share the profits derived from the use of their wild genetic resources).
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the background of profit-sharing and stressing the significant
benefits it can bring leads to the natural conclusion that new
legislation must be enacted as judicial resolution is inadequate and
existing legislation is insufficient.
A. Background of Profit-sharing
Even though profit-sharing with respect to natural resources
found on public lands has not yet been implemented in the United
States, it has gained support at the international level. 57 The
concept of profit-sharing internationally arose from the fact that
numerous private corporations from industrial nations conduct
bioprospecting activities in lesser developed countries and derive
substantial profits without giving any part thereof to the countries
from which the valuable natural resources emanated.15 The
disparity between the immense benefit to industrial nations and the
complete lack of revenue to the originating countries was a major
factor in the development of the United Nations Convention on
Biological Diversity in 1992 ("Biodiversity Treaty"). 5 9
The Biodiversity Treaty specifically provides for sharing the
profits derived from commercial applications by one member
157 See infra note 168 and accompanying text (explaining various policies
implemented by foreign countries in order for the governments of those countries
to share the profits derived from the use of their wild genetic resources).
58 See Adair, supra note 2, at 141 (stating that private biotechnology
companies reaped substantial benefits from the use of wild genetic resources
while justifying free access to those resources "by arguing that their use of these
resources led to benefits that accrued to all the people of the world"). Wild
genetic resources were traditionally viewed as a "'common heritage of
humankind' that should be available without restriction" and, therefore, the
countries in which such resources were found granted to others free rights to
collect specimens. Adair, supra note 2, at 141. See also Mattix, supra note 7, at
530 (stating that historically, private bioprospecting companies have had free
access to genetic resources found on public lands and noting that the activities
conducted by private bioprospecting companies may lead to the development of
"valuable commercial product[s] that benefit mankind," and that those companies
may derive substantial benefits from the development of such products).
"9 Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 3, at 818. See Adair, supra note 2, at 141
(explaining that developing countries began to discuss the unfairness of the
situation and to ask for changes).
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country of the wild genetic resources found in another member
country. 16° One basis upon which the Biodiversity Treaty was
founded was the agreement signed in 1991 between the National
Biodiversity Institute of Costa Rica ("INBio"), 161 a not-for-profit
scientific organization, and Merck pharmaceutical company
("Merck-INBio agreement"). 162 Costa Rica had been an early
advocate for change where developing countries did not receive any
of the profits derived from the use of their biodiversity1 63 As a
measure to stop granting free use of its wild genetic resources to
biotechnology companies and to regulate access to those resources,
Costa Rica established INBio at the end of the 1980s.' 64 The
Merck-INBio agreement provided that INBio would receive
royalties on any pharmaceutical products developed by Merck from
plant, animal, and soil chemical samples given to Merck by
INBio' 65 Additionally, Merck paid INBio a fee and gave INBio
scientific equipment in exchange for such chemical samples and the
exclusive right to their exploitation. 66
160 Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 3, at 828. Article 15, section 7 provides
that each contracting party to the Biodiversity Treaty shall take measures toward
"sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and development and
the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic
resources with the [c]ontracting [plarty providing such resources." Biodiversity
Treaty, supra note 3, at 828. Additionally, such sharing of profits shall be
implemented "upon mutually agreed terms." Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 3,
at 828.
161 Yellowstone, supra note 34. See also Mattix, supra note 7, at 531 (noting
that the Biodiversity Treaty, particularly Article 15 thereof, "reflects the concepts
embodied in [Costa Rica's] Merck/InBio agreement"); Adair, supra note 2, at
142 (stating that the Biodiversity Treaty embodies the basic principles established
by the Merck-INBio agreement).
162 See Adair, supra note 2, at 141-42.
163 See Mattix, supra note 7, at 531 (stating that "Costa Rica was one of the
first countries to seek greater benefits from bioprospectors and set the stage for
the [Biodiversity Treaty]"); Adair, supra note 2, at 141.
'64 See Adair, supra note 2, at 141-42.
165 Adair, supra note 2, at 142 (adding that "[flifty percent of these royalties
will be paid to Costa Rica's National Park Fund").
'66 Adair, supra note 2, at 142 (stating that Merck paid INBio a fee in the
amount of $1 million and gave INBio $130,000 worth of scientific equipment in
exchange for 10,000 chemical samples and the exclusive right to analyze them
522
PROFIT-SHARING
The United States declined to sign the Biodiversity Treaty when
it was finalized in 1992 and, although President Clinton signed it
in 1993, the Senate has failed to ratify it. 167 The Biodiversity
Treaty represents a major step toward the globalization of fair
access to biodiversity and is a model to be followed.168 The
for two years). See also Mattix, supra note 7, at 531 (adding that INBio and
Merck "shared worldwide licensing rights for products developed from the
[animal, plant, and soil] samples [given by INBio to Merck]").
167 See Adair, supra note 2, at 144-45 (pointing out that the Biodiversity
Treaty was enacted internationally on December 29, 1993 and that the United
States would retain observer status until it ratifies it). See also Parties to
Biodiversity Treaty Make Some Progress on Implementation, Bus. & ENV'T, Jan.
1, 1995 (explaining that parties that have not yet ratified the Biodiversity Treaty
may attend its meetings but do not qualify as "parties" and therefore may not
participate in the decision-making process); Rick Weiss and Justin Gillis, U.S.
"Observers" Lobby Against Trade Curbs on Biotechnology; Accord Would be
First to Target Genetically Engineered Products, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1999,
at A4. The United States still has not ratified the Biodiversity Treaty, which has
been consistently opposed in the Senate by Sen. Jesse Helms. Joan Lowy,
Environmental Nightmare; Foreign Species Are Disrupting Local Ecosystems,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 1999, at Hi; Joan Lowy, Foreign
Invaders Threaten Environment Across Nation, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH),
Aug. 15, 1999, at 28A. Congress's persistent refusal to ratify the Biodiversity
Treaty since 1993 is partly due to the U.S. pharmaceutical industry's lobbying
against ratification. Anthony Faiola, Amazon Cash Crop; Brazil Seeks "Bioroyal-
ties" from Western Drug Firms, WASH. POST, July 9, 1999, at A2 1. See also
Andrew Pollack, Biological Products Raise Genetic Ownership Issues, N.Y.
TlIMES, Nov. 26, 1999, at Al (reporting that "the United States Senate has never
ratified [the Biodiversity Treaty], in part because of fears it would hurt the
biotechnology industry"). Despite the fact that the United States has not ratified
the Biodiversity Treaty, 175 countries had ratified it as of September 30, 1999.
UN: Committee Hears Calls for Action on Biosafety Protocol, Commitment Small
Island Developing States, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 26, 1999.
168 See Adair, supra note 2, at 145-46 (stating that many countries have been
enthusiastic about the enactment of the Biodiversity Treaty and that Mexico,
Indonesia, and Kenya have developed similar agreements to the Merck-INBio
agreement). See also Pollack, supra note 167, at Al (mentioning that numerous
countries, including the Philippines, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, and India, have implemented or are considering
legislation regulating access to genetic resources and "requiring compensation");
Faiola, supra note 167, at A21 (explaining the interest of pharmaceutical
companies and "foreign institutions" in Brazil's "cat's nail," a leaf found in the
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Merck-INBio agreement itself, which is a major illustration of
successful profit-sharing, has already been considered as a possible
model for use in the United States. 169 However, the United States
currently lags behind its international counterparts in this major
aspect of natural resource preservation, as illustrated by the 1997
CRADA between Yellowstone National Park and Diversa Corpora-
tion, which was the first to include a profit-sharing provision with
respect to federal lands.
B. Potential Benefits and Arguable Disadvantages of Profit-
sharing
Allowing the federal government to receive some of the profits
obtained from commercial application of natural resources found
on public lands will benefit the public because, by using these
profits to maintain public lands and the natural resources they
contain, the federal government can ensure that their beauty and
wilderness are protected consistent with the intent of existing
laws.17° In addition, profit-sharing will not impair the rights of
recreational users to enjoy the public lands. Federal lands for many
years have provided for both public enjoyment and exploitation by
Amazon which is believed to fight certain tumors, and noting that Brazil "is
among an increasing number of tropical nations trying to prevent [uncompensated
use of their natural resources] by the West"). As Faiola points out, Brazil, which
has not yet ratified the Biodiversity Treaty, is in the process of implementing its
own version of the Treaty, requiring that foreign institutions pay royalties on
"any income they derive from plants [found on Brazilian territory]." Faiola,
supra note 167, at A21.
169 Yellowstone, supra note 34 (explaining the advantages of receiving
income from commercial use of publicly owned natural resources and noting that
"Yellowstone Superintendent Mike Finley and some of his science staff visited
Costa Rica in 1996 to learn first-hand about the INBio program-a possible
model for future use of resources developed from research done in [United
States] national parks").
170 See Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1999); 16
U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1994) (providing that wilderness areas, including national
forests, national parks, and national wildlife refuges, "shall be devoted to the




private parties.171 Therefore, commercial bioprospecting on public
lands with the government sharing in the profits would only be one
more example of such multiple uses. 7 2 Likewise, authorizing a
federal agency such as the NPS to receive profits derived from
natural resources found on its lands would be consistent with
congressional intent that public lands contribute to the nation's
economic success173 and would simply allocate to the federal
agency its fair share of such success.' 74
171 See Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods?
Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural
Resources, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 493, 522-23 (1994) (explaining the multiple uses
of federal lands by noting the coexistence of such diverse activities as "oil,
mineral, and timber harvesting, as well as ranching and recreation," and stating
that "[tihe extensive, multi-faceted use of federal lands allows private interests
to claim that they enjoy certain exploitation rights which the public may not
curtail without providing compensation").
172 Yellowstone, supra note 34 (recognizing that the Park's mission is "to
preserve and protect park resources" while "allow[ing] public access, as long as
no harm is done, to those resources").
173 See Chem Serv., Inc. v. Environmental Monitoring Sys. Lab., 12 F.3d
1256, 1258, 1265 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that Congress's intent in enacting the
Federal Technology Transfer Act ("FTTA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3710a-3710d, was "'to
improve the transfer of commercially useful technologies from the Federal
laboratories and into the private sector"' (quoting S. REP. No. 99-283, at 1
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3442) and that "Congress intended the
FITA to be used to transfer technology from the laboratories and increase the
nation's economic competitiveness").
114 See S. REP. No. 99-283 (1986) (recommending that the FITA be passed).
In recommending adoption of the FVITA, the Senate emphasized that collabora-
tion between federal laboratories and the industry was required by the national
interest and that "[t]he ultimate purpose of [flederal support for [research and
development] is to develop the science and technology base needed for a strong
national defense, for the health and well-being of U.S. citizens, and for a healthy
U.S. economy." Id. at 2. The Senate defined federal laboratories broadly as a
"facility or group of facilities owned, leased, or otherwise used by a Federal
agency, a substantial purpose of which is the performance of research and
development by employees of the Federal Government." Id. at 11. The Senate
specifically recommended that federal agencies be allowed to enter into
"cooperative research agreements" with universities, the industry, and other
parties, and to "negotiate patent licensing agreements." Id. at 5. With respect to
the issue of compensation, the Senate recommended that, should an invention
developed by an agency employee be licensed to the agency, 15% of the
525
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
The government should be permitted to benefit financially from
bioprospecting to the same extent the biotechnology industry does.
Specifically, patent law175 affords broad protection to companies
engaged in bioprospecting, allowing them to enjoy a monopoly 76
and to reap substantial benefits from products derived from the use
of wild genetic resources found on public lands.177 While the
biotechnology industry becomes wealthier by preventing others
from developing the same products for many years, the federal
government currently does not share in any of that wealth.
royalties received would be allocated to the inventor and the balance distributed
among the laboratories under the agency's authority. Id. More significantly, with
respect to the issue of profit-sharing, the Senate recommended adoption of
section 5 whereby, within the scope of cooperative research agreements, defined
as agreements in which the federal government "provides resources, but not
funds," federal laboratories would have "the authority to accept funds, services,
and property from the collaborating parties." Id. at 10 (emphasis added). Finally,
the Senate pointed out that "the primary purpose of [cooperative research]
agreements is to take technologies that originate in [federal] laboratories [as
defined above] and to stimulate or support their development and commercializa-
tion." Id. at 11 (emphasis added). Thus, commercialization of and financial
benefits from inventions resulting from cooperative research agreements between
the federal government and third parties was a major part of the proposed bill.
See also Yellowstone, supra note 34 (acknowledging that, as industrial
applications of research specimens collected in Yellowstone National Park can
lead to a substantial benefit to corporations, "the park resources can also reap
some of this benefit without commercialization and detriment").
175 See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (West 2000). The Patent
Act provides that "[wihoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor." Id. § 101.
176 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 2000) (providing that, for a term of 20
years from the filing date of a patent application, a patentee enjoys the right "to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention" for
which a patent was granted).
177 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that the patent received
by a biotechnology company for the Taq polymerase chain reaction was sold to
the pharmaceutical company Hoffman-La Roche for $300 million). See also
Michaels, supra note 16, at 16-17 (stating that the revenues from applications of
the Taq polymerase chain reaction were expected to reach over $1 billion by the
new millennium and that annual revenues from taxol, which was originally
developed from bark of Pacific yew trees harvested in national forests, is also
expected to exceed $1 billion).
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Allowing the government to share the profits gained by biotechnol-
ogy companies from their patented products 178 would reduce the
imbalance created by their exclusive benefit of patent law and the
monopolistic advantages it affords.
Besides bridging the gap between the benefits reaped by the
biotechnology industry and the lack of profits received by federal
agencies such as the NPS, profit-sharing may help resolve the
financial crisis facing the NPS. 179 As more visitors enjoy the
national parks each year, the NPS is facing increasing maintenance
costs. is At the same time, it is more difficult for the NPS to
maintain a balance between its purposes of preservation and
recreation.' Despite soaring costs, the NPS does not have the
authority to raise park entrance fees.' 82 Raising those fees would
help the NPS solve its financial difficulties but, since it is not
178 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (holding that
patent protection could be afforded to human-made, genetically engineered
bacteria). See also Michaels, supra note 16, at 36-37 (noting that the Diamond
decision set precedent for extension of patent protection to "a host of biotechnol-
ogy products").
179 Plan Needed to Offset Funding Cuts for National Parks (National Public
Radio broadcast, July 23, 1996) (noting that in 1996 the NPS was already
"approaching financial crisis" with a decreasing annual budget since 1983 and
overdue maintenance and repairs). See Todd Wilkinson, Taking the Initiative,
NAT'L PARKS, Nov. 1, 1999, at 30 (noting the current crisis facing the NPS,
including "a $3.54-billion backlog in infrastructure maintenance, controversy over
agency spending, declining employee morale, and growing concern about
insufficient funding to assess the status of imperiled wildlife and plants"); Denise
M. Visconti, Note, Reform in the National Park System: Is Vision 2020 Enough?,
23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 409, 431 (1999) (noting the NPS's "current budgetary
crisis").
'80 Plan Needed to Offset Funding Cuts for National Parks, supra note 179
(noting that national park visitation is growing by five to ten percent a year,
making it very difficult for "funding to keep up with the need"); Wilkinson,
supra note 179, at 30 (pointing out increasing expenses, including the costs of
meeting the requirements of new laws).
181 Plan Needed to Offset Funding Cuts for National Parks, supra note 179
(pointing out the growing conflict between preservation and access to the public
and reporting that lack of sufficient funds have led to the deterioration of
numerous facilities in the national parks).
182 Visconti, supra note 179, at 427-28 (stating that the NPS lacks "authority
over park entrance fees").
527
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
allowed to do so, it must look for other means of raising necessary
funds. 183 Receiving a share of the profits derived from commer-
cial uses of natural resources found in national parks is therefore
a fund-raising method that the NPS should be permitted to
consider.
Contrary to claims regarding the environmental consequences
of entering into CRADAs such as the agreement involved in
Edmonds Institute,"8 these agreements will not lead to further
harm to the environment, since the NPS already has statutory
authority to grant research permits for educational or scientific
purposes and uses such authority. 185 The fact that the NPS now
may be able to receive benefits from the results of research
183 Visconti, supra note 179, at 428 (pointing out that, although "money
alone is hardly the solution to the dire condition of the National Parks,"
increasing recreation fees would be one method towards solving the NPS's
financial crisis).
184 Even though the environmental consequences of the Yellowstone-Diversa
CRADA may not be known at the time it is entered into, the court in Edmonds
Institute recognized, and the defendants conceded, that the overall impact of
collecting specimens, despite each sample being only the size of a teaspoon, is
not "teaspoon-sized" and will intrude "into the delicate ecosystems around
Yellowstone's thermal features." Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11
(D.D.C. 1999). Additionally, in their complaint the plaintiffs in Edmonds Institute
alleged that, as a result of the Yellowstone-Diversa CRADA, Yellowstone
National Park's "scenery and natural objects, curiosities and wonders" would not
be kept in a "natural, unspoiled and unimpaired condition" and therefore
plaintiffs' "aesthetic, recreational, informational and educational, and economic
interests" would be "directly and adversely affected." First Amended Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7, 9, Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 98-561). Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the
areas of Yellowstone National Park where specimen collection takes place will
be permanently injured as a result of the permanent removal from the park of
"biologic materials, plants and rocks and other resources." First Amended
Complaint at 20.
185 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (granting the Secretary
of the Interior the authority to "make and publish such rules and regulations as
he may deem necessary or proper for the use and management of the parks,
monuments, and reservations under the jurisdiction of the National Park
Service"); 36 C.F.R. § 2.5 (1999); Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (noting
that in recent years the NPS has granted approximately 250 to 300 research
permits annually, including 40 or 50 for "microbial research projects").
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undertaken through such permits does not mean that more permits
will be granted to the detriment of the environment because the
NPS "has neither authority nor desire to harm the resources [it] is
charged to protect" and a profit-sharing provision will simply be an
added benefit to the routine practice of granting research collection
permits. 86 To the contrary, receiving funds for use of its natural
resources will enable the government to invest greater resources in
the creation of biodiversity reserves, thereby ameliorating the
current biodiversity crisis. 181
Biodiversity, or biological diversity, can be defined as "the
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter
alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the
ecological complexes of which they are part; [including] diversity
within species, between species and of ecosystems. ' 88 As one
commentator stated, "[t]he loss of biodiversity is generally agreed
to be among the top environmental crises facing humanity today"
and "[t]here are numerous justifications for preserving bio-
diversity."1 89 The loss of biodiversity has recently reached a
186 Yellowstone, supra note 34.
187 Yellowstone, supra note 34 (acknowledging that the CRADA the Park
entered into with Diversa Corporation, which is the subject of the Edmonds
Institute litigation, "does not enable Diversa to do anything that was not already
allowed under the NPS research permit system" and "simply provides compensa-
tion to the park for access"). Additionally, Yellowstone National Park expects
that, through bioprospecting agreements such as the one involved in Edmonds
Institute, the park will "bolster its conservation mission while encouraging
research that may continue to benefit humankind." Yellowstone, supra note 34.
188 Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 3, at 823.
189 Heisel, supra note 19, at 233 n.13 (explaining that it is important to
preserve biodiversity because it: (i) "'supports the integrity and resilience of
ecological systems on which humans depend' by providing genetic variation to
allow for future adaptation and evolution in response to changes in climate and
other broadscale [sic] changes to the environment"; (ii) "harbors the sources of
new medicines"; (iii) "provides a source of new food crops and a reserve of
genetic traits that may improve species already used for human sustenance"; (iv)
has an "intrinsic value that justifies its preservation in addition to, or absent, any
anthropocentric concerns"; and (v) "is aesthetically valuable and enhances our
everyday surroundings"). See also Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 11-12
(pointing out that biodiversity "sustains life," that, in order to fully understand
the necessity of biodiversity preservation, people must "become more aware of
529
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critical level because of the alarming rate at which species have
become extinct and habitats have been put at risk.' 9° Even though
recent efforts have been made to preserve biodiversity on federal
public lands, such efforts have not been sufficient to establish a
comprehensive biodiversity reserve system.191 A considerable
their reliance on local, regional, and global ecosystems," and that loss of
biodiversity "threatens to destabilize" those ecosystems, and thereby destroy
essential resources to humans); Richard J. Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges:
Theory, Practice, and Prospect, 18 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1994) (noting
that "[t]he deteriorating condition of wildlife populations-as measured by
statistics such as extinction rates and loss of biological diversity-is one of the
principal environmental problems facing the United States and the world" and
stating that, because "public recognition of the values of wildlife has increased,"
biodiversity preservation has become a more serious concern).
"9 See Neil Gunningham & Mike D. Young, Toward Optimal Environmental
Policy: The Case of Biodiversity Conservation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 248-49
(1997) (recognizing the increasing rate of biodiversity loss worldwide, stating
that every year, "more than 10,000 species become extinct globally," and noting
that "scientists estimate that roughly five to ten percent of tropical forest species
face extinction within the next thirty years," possibly resulting in the extinction
of "60,000 of the world's plant species, and perhaps even higher proportions of
vertebrate and insect species"). Since very often "biodiversity loss is irrevers-
ible," the crisis level reached recently is highly significant and it is extremely
important to take steps preventing further loss of biodiversity before "a major
environmental catastrophe or system collapse" occurs. Id. at 251. See also David
Eugene Bell, The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity: The Continuing
Significance of U.S. Objections at the Earth Summit, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 479, 487-90 (1993) (noting the increasing rate of species extinction due
to human intervention, stating that some experts suggest that "twenty-five percent
of the world's species present in the mid-1980s may be extinct by the year
2015," and pointing out the "potential for mass extinctions" of numerous
species); Christopher J. Hunter, Comment, Sustainable Bioprospecting: Using
Private Contracts and International Legal Principles and Policies to Conserve
Raw Medicinal Materials, 25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 129, 134-35 (1997)
(estimating that, "without greater global conservation efforts, twenty-five percent
of the world's species will become extinct within the next fifty years, while the
habitats in which they live will suffer a similar rate of extinction through
deforestation, desertification, and destruction of wetlands" and that the rate of
extinction as well as the lack of specific knowledge of numerous species have
produced a "dangerous situation").
191 Heisel, supra note 19, at 252-54 (stating that efforts to preserve biodiver-
sity must start with a "comprehensive national biological inventory" implemented
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amount of planning and consultation is needed to create bio-
diversity reserves. 192 In order to do so, additional funds are
needed. 93 One way to obtain the necessary funds is to allow for
profit-sharing between the federal government and private corpora-
tions in return for the use of natural resources found on public
lands. Allowing federal agencies to enter into CRADAs such as the
one challenged in Edmonds Institute would be a much needed first
step toward solving the current biodiversity crisis.
Finally, allowing federal agencies to receive part of the profits
derived from commercial use of public land biodiversity may be an
incentive to implement conservation strategies.1 94 For example,
federal agencies could focus on entering into CRADAs solely with
corporations whose bioprospecting activities would not result in
by a "cohesive system for gathering biological data" because gathering such data
and assessing the value of biological resources on federal lands is essential to
remedying the current crisis). The results of an assessment of the biological
worth of public lands then can be used for "use restrictions on those lands of
high biological value," "to ease or lift restrictions where biodiversity is not
threatened," and "to ensure that any federal land disposition, through land
exchanges or otherwise, does not impair the goal of biodiversity preservation."
Heisel, supra note 19, at 252. Recent efforts by the government to create an
agency whose tasks would include "inventorying, mapping, and monitoring
biodiversity, and performing research that [would] enable the government to
make more informed natural resource decisions" have come under attack,
possibly undermining those steps toward biodiversity preservation. Heisel, supra
note 19, at 254-55.
'" See Heisel, supra note 19, at 261-63.
193 Heisel, supra note 19, at 264 (noting that the resources available are not
sufficient to meet the needs of biodiversity preservation). Heisel further notes
that "the political will necessary to make [the resources] available" is not
adequate either. Heisel, supra note 19, at 264. However, making the necessary
funds available by allowing for profit-sharing is a concept that legislators may
not have considered fully to date and that may appeal to them, thereby creating
the required "political will." Heisel also describes various existing federal laws
and programs that "can be used to preserve biodiversity through federal land
ownership" and concludes that improving or altering them may be an essential
step toward biodiversity preservation. Heisel, supra note 19, at 264-308.
'9' Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 15-16 (explaining that economic
incentives may be beneficial to environmental regulation provided that such
incentives do not "create an entitlement to conduct environmentally damaging
activities").
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environmental harm or biodiversity loss. Even though this argument
is usually made in the context of compensation to private parties
in return for environmental conservation,19" it equally could be
made in favor of compensating the federal government.
Despite the potential benefits of profit-sharing, opponents argue
that its disadvantages warrant against it being implemented. One
commentator has argued that profit-sharing should not be allowed
because commercial activities in connection with national parks are
objectionable and may lead to a slippery slope. 196 Specifically,
the article sets forth three major objections to such commercializa-
tion' 97 and suggests that two of them are particularly relevant in
the context of bioprospecting, namely the negative impacts of
"commodification" '98 and the fact that only a portion of the
public will enjoy the benefits of commercialization.1 99 These two
objections can be countered by the facts that (1) any negative
impact from commercialization of bioprospecting will be out-
weighed by the benefit of additional revenue to be used for the
'9' Clark & Downes, supra note 4, at 16.
196 Holly Doremus, Nature, Knowledge and Profit: The Yellowstone
Bioprospecting Controversy and the Core Purposes of America's National Parks,
26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 469-77 (1999).
197 Id. at 472 (stating that allowing commercial activities may lead the
national parks to slide down a slippery slope, that "commodification" will affect
the national parks negatively, and that only a "small portion of the public" enjoys
the benefits of commercialization, whereas the national parks should be for the
enjoyment of the public at large). The slippery slope objection "is connected
principally to concern for the physical resources of [national] parks" and to the
fear that, "if commercial use is allowed at all, it may prove impossible to restrict
it." Id. The commodification objection relates to the idea that "commercial
transactions rob [national] parks of their special status as resources removed from
the marketplace" and that nature should not be treated as a "fungible article of
trade." Id. at 473-74. The final objection to commercialization is that "commerce
serves private interests, while the resources of [national] parks should be reserved
for the benefit of the public as a whole" and that "[a]llowing a few to exploit
[national] parks to line their own pockets is inconsistent with the parks' tradition
of shared use and access." Id. at 476.
198 Id. at 469, 473 (explaining that commodification is the treatment of
natural resources, which are removed from the marketplace, as market
commodities).
'99 Id. at 479-81.
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further protection of the environment and the enjoyment of the
public, and (2) the public at large will benefit from the use of that
additional revenue.2 °
It is also argued that commercial bioprospecting in national
parks is "inconsistent with the inspirational purposes of the
parks." 20 However, national parks already have several purpos-
es.2°2 Only one of them is the enjoyment of the beauty and
wilderness by the public and there is no reason to believe that
commercializing bioprospecting will alter the balance between
those purposes.2 3 Finally, it is argued that the decision to com-
mercialize bioprospecting should not be made by either the
Department of the Interior or a national park without specific
congressional mandate.2" Congress, however, has recently moved
in the direction of allowing commercial bioprospecting and profit-
sharing with the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998.205
o See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text (discussing the various
purposes of federal lands, specifically the national parks).
201 Doremus, supra note 196, at 407. Doremus explains that the national
parks "should be places where the populace can be inspired with the wonder of
nature and the understanding that some things are too special to be sold."
Doremus, supra note 196, at 438. Defining inspiration further, Doremus adds that
"the special function of the natural units of the park system today is to expose
all visitors to nature in a way that inspires wonder, awe and respect." Doremus,
supra note 196, at 447-48.
202 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1994) (providing that national parks were designed
to fulfill several purposes of "recreational, scenic, scientific, educational,
conservation, and historical use").
203 See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text (discussing the mission
of the NPS).
204 Doremus, supra note 196, at 477, 483.
205 National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-391,
112 Stat. 3497, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, la, 3, 17b, 20, 470h, 5901, 5911-
5914, 5931-5937, 5951-5966, 5981-5982, 5991-5995, 6011 (Supp. IV 1998). The
primary purpose of the statute is to "provide for improved management and
increased accountability for certain National Park Service programs, and for other
purposes." Id. Significantly, Doremus herself concedes that the National Parks
Omnibus Management Act of 1998 "contains a provision that may have been
intended to validate [the CRADA between Diversa and the NPS challenged in
Edmonds Institute]." Doremus, supra note 196, at 425-26. Doremus further states
that the provision in the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998
allowing for profit-sharing arrangements "could be cited to support an argument
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Furthermore, opponents may charge that once the federal
government is allowed to receive profits from commercial uses of
public lands, it will issue a larger number of bioprospecting permits
in order to gain more profits, which will lead to the destruction of
the environment. Regardless of whether profit-sharing leads to a
higher number of permits,2" however, several facts show that it
cannot be forbidden. First, the "explosive growth in the commer-
cialization of biotechnology" must inevitably lead to profit-sharing
among the different parties involved in order to ensure fruitful
collaboration.2 °7 Second, the raw materials used for research and
potential commercial development are absolutely necessary to the
resulting product and therefore fairness and equity simply require
that the provider of such raw materials be compensated for their
use.20 8 Finally, the concept of property is broad enough to en-
compass rights and privileges, thereby recognizing the right of any
property owner to derive profits from its use.2° In addition, one
that the Park Service enjoys the discretion to permit bioprospecting" before
alleging that such provision does not validate the Diversa CRADA. Doremus,
supra note 196, at 431. See also infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text
(further discussing the profit-sharing opportunities provided by the National Parks
Omnibus Management Act of 1998).
206 As previously explained, profit-sharing will not lead to a higher number
of permits. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
207 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 507 (Cal. 1990)
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 511, 516 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See Heidt, supra note 109, at 706-
07, 714 (recognizing and rejecting a fairness and equity argument in favor of
allowing a patient to share revenues derived from the commercialization of his
or her cells); Gold, supra note 105, at 1246 (noting that the situation whereby
"researchers and pharmaceutical companies are likely to be able to apply for and
receive patent rights in human tissues while the sources of such tissues are left
without compensation, is not acceptable" and that patients "will continue to feel
exploited as their bodies are treated as natural resources by others while they are
not permitted to participate in such exploitation").
209 Moore, 793 P.2d at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See Martin v. City of
Gadsden, 584 So. 2d 796, 797-98 (Ala. 1991) (recognizing a city's right, as
landowner, to use its land for commercial purposes and to derive a profit
therefrom); Minard Run Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Co., 214 A.2d 234, 235 (Pa. 1965)
(recognizing a landowner's right to use his land "in a manner profitable to [his]
own business" and to derive "the greatest profit therefrom").
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of the fundamental components of the bundle of property rights is
the right "to dispose of the property by sale or by gift" which
empowers an owner to sell its property or any parts thereof for a
profit.21
0
Finally, the enactment of adequate legislation can prevent the
issuance of a higher number of bioprospecting permits and, thus,
that argument against profit-sharing is moot. Such legislation will
need to provide specifically that the number of permits issued shall
remain unchanged and that profit-sharing shall not authorize federal
agencies simply to commercialize natural resources and turn public
lands into a profit-making enterprise. As judicial action has proved
to be inadequate, Congress is moving in the right direction through
the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998.
C. Insufficiency of Judicial Precedent and the Beginning of
Statutory Resolution of Profit-sharing: The National
Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998
Although the Edmonds Institute court may reach a final
decision in favor of profit-sharing, judicial precedent alone cannot
resolve the issue.21 First, courts in other jurisdictions will not be
210 Moore, 793 P.2d at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See Munzer, supra note
105, at 514-15 (giving examples of a person's right to dispose by sale or by gift
of certain body parts, such as a woman's power to "donate her ova to aid
infertile couples," a man's power to "sell his semen to a sperm bank," or an
adult's right to "sell a pint of his or her blood").
211 See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 248 N.E.2d 871, 875-76 (N.Y.
1969) (recognizing that, in developing tort law, the judiciary and the legislature
play complementary roles and that "Uludicial action is often necessary to bring
to the attention of the Legislature a particular problem in order for it to
accomplish the necessary reform which only legislative action can fashion"). But
see Shands Teaching Hosp. v. Smith, 480 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that, absent "constitutional or statutory authority reflecting a change in
established law," the Florida courts do not have the authority to overrule
"controlling precedent of the Florida Supreme Court" and that changing the law
is within the power of the legislature rather than the courts). The issue of
whether legislation is needed for certainty and uniformity as opposed to simply
following precedent arose in a very different context from that in Edmonds
Institute, namely, in the context of an action by a hospital against the wife of a
deceased patient for non-payment of the husband's medical bills. Id.
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bound by the decision reached by the court in Edmonds Institute.
Second, the fact that some courts may follow Edmonds Institute
while others may not will result in uncertainty of outcome 212 and
possibly lead to a proliferation of litigation by parties that may
decide to file suit on the ground that they have a fifty percent
chance of winning. Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that a
majority of jurisdictions will adopt the Edmonds Institute decision
as precedent, it will take time before uniformity is achieved
throughout the country, thereby resulting in litigation that may have
been avoided had a standard been adopted earlier. Those factors
show that relying solely on judicial precedent to resolve the issue
of governmental profit-sharing will result in inefficient administra-
tion of justice, which is contrary to the goal of the judiciary to
ensure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
[case]. ' '213 Legislation governing the issue, on the other hand, will
provide certainty of outcome and uniformity, thereby benefitting
society as a whole.
A first indication of a legislative resolution of profit-sharing
was the enactment of the National Parks Omnibus Management Act
of 1998 ("NPOMA"), 214 which may be a significant step in
212 See Flanagan, 248 N.E.2d at 875 (illustrating the uncertainty of outcome
resulting from the legislature's inaction by overruling an established precedent
in order to give a plaintiff a medical malpractice cause of action (citing Woods
v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 173 N.E.2d 773
(N.Y. 1961))). See also Arrow Builders Supply Corp. v. Hudson Terrace
Apartments, 105 A.2d 387, 391 (N.J. 1954) (arguing in favor of overruling
established precedent in certain circumstances by acknowledging that, despite the
"great social value" of "stability and predictability" in the legal system, the
principle of stare decisis is not absolute and must sometimes be sacrificed in
favor of "serv[ing] justly the needs of present day society").
213 FED. R. CIv. P. 1 (also defining the scope and purpose of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as "govem[ing] the procedure in the United States
district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or
in equity"). Under the United States Constitution, courts have the power to
decide a broad range of cases at law and in equity. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; § 2,
cl. 1. The application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the efficient
administration of justice fall within the constitutional mandate given the courts.
214 Pub. L. No. 105-391, 112 Stat. 3497, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, la, 3,
17b, 20, 470h, 5901, 5911-5914, 5931-5937, 5951-5966, 5981-5982, 5991-5995,
6011 (Supp. IV 1998).
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Congress recognizing a need for more efficient management of the
National Park system, including the need for the NPS to receive
profits derived from the use of its natural resources.215 NPOMA
was developed as a result of the NPS's recognition that it was
"unable to achieve even the most fundamental aspects of its
mission.' 21 6 The primary purpose of NPOMA is to "provide for
improved management and increased accountability for certain
National Park Service programs, and for other purposes ' 21 7 and
thus to restore the NPS's health and ensure its long-term viabili-
ty.21
8
One major change brought about by NPOMA over previous
statutes is the opportunity for the NPS to enter into profit-sharing
agreements with the "private industry' 21 9 and not solely with the
"research community., 22' This new legislation recognizes that
receiving profits obtained from commercial uses of natural
resources found in national parks may assist the NPS in furthering
its purpose of "conserv[ing] the scenery and the natural and historic
objects and the wild life [in the national parks] and [providing] for
the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as
will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future genera-
tions.",22' Additionally, it is clear from the language of the Act
that profit-sharing arrangements will not be allowed to the
detriment of the protection of the natural resources found in
national parks222 but rather will provide for the enhancement of
215 16 U.S.C. § 5935(d) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that "[tihe Secretary [of
the Interior] may enter into negotiations with the research community and private
industry for equitable, efficient benefits-sharing arrangements").
216 Visconti, supra note 179, at 410. The NPS situation was assessed at a
symposium held in October 1991 in Vail, Colorado. Visconti, supra note 179,
at 410. In order to address some of the problems facing the NPS, Congress
passed a bill entitled "Vision 2020: National Parks Restoration Act" in October
1998, the title of which was changed to the National Parks Omnibus Manage-
ment Act of 1998 after it passed in the House. Visconti, supra note 179, at 411.
217 Pub. L. No. 105-391, 112 Stat. 3497 (1998).
218 Visconti, supra note 179, at 411-12.
219 16 U.S.C. § 5935(d).
220 id
221 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
222 16 U.S.C. § 5931(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
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"management and protection of national park resources. 223
Finally, the Act reiterates Congress's intent to promote quality
scientific studies of national park resources 224 and to give the
NPS broad authority to solicit such studies.225
In spite of its many efforts to better the NPS's current econom-
ic situation, NPOMA cannot achieve that goal as it is currently
drafted because it provides mainly for revenues to the NPS in the
form of concession contracts, 226 thus providing "a $38 million
panacea to an estimated $8 billion crisis. 227 Similarly, despite
language in NPOMA addressing the protection of natural re-
223 16 U.S.C. § 5935(b)(2).
224 16 U.S.C. § 5931(2) (providing that management and protection of
national park resources shall be enhanced "by providing clear authority and
direction for the conduct of scientific study in the National Park System"); 16
U.S.C. § 5931(4) (stating as one of the purposes of this subchapter the
encouragement of others "to use the National Park System for study to the
benefit of park management as well as broader scientific value"); 16 U.S.C.
§ 5932 (Supp. IV 1998) ("The Secretary [of the Interior] is authorized and
directed to assure that management of units of the National Park System is
enhanced by the availability and utilization of a broad program of the highest
quality science and information.").
225 16 U.S.C. § 5935(a) (Supp. IV 1998) (reflecting Congress's intent that
"[tihe Secretary [of the Interior] may solicit, receive, and consider requests from
Federal or non-Federal public or private agencies, organizations, individuals, or
other entities for the use of any unit of the National Park System for purposes
of scientific study").
226 See Visconti, supra note 179, at 412 n.14.
227 Visconti, supra note 179, at 412-13. The funds needed by the NPS
include "capital construction needs," "natural resource protection," "cultural
resource management needs," and "land acquisition obligations." Visconti, supra
note 179, at 412 n. 15. Visconti explains that capital construction needs include
"infrastructure repairs, building and land restoration, improvements to employee
housing, and repairs to utilities," and cultural resource management needs
encompass "preservation and cataloging of museum collections, archeological
surveys, and ethnographic studies." Visconti, supra note 179, at 412 n.15. See
143 CONG. REc. S3233, S3234 (1997) (statement of Sen. Thomas) (explaining
that authorized land acquisitions are "private lands that are authorized within
authorized park boundaries, but ... have never been acquired" and stating that
natural resource protection includes gathering "basic information on the extent[,]




sources228 and promotion of scientific studies,229 NPOMA fails
to make natural resource conservation a priority and to include
provisions that would specifically require protection of natural
resources. 230
In order for NPOMA to provide for additional revenue needed
by the NPS and, therefore, contribute to a greater extent to natural
resource protection, it needs further provisions that specifically
authorize profit-sharing provisions in CRADAs or allow patent
royalties. 231 Additionally, NPOMA should clarify what acceptable
uses the NPS may make of the profits it receives from the private
industry, such as reinvesting those profits into the conservation and
protection of the environment, including natural resources found on
public lands.232 Even though NPOMA is a step forward in resolv-
ing the issue raised in Edmonds Institute, it needs to provide for
additional guidance on which potential parties to a CRADA may
rely and that the judiciary may apply in future litigation. 33
228 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 5931(2), 5935(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
229 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 5931(2), 5931(4), 5932, 5935(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
23 See Visconti, supra note 179, at 437-38 (noting that NPOMA "fails to
address many of the major threats to the resources the NPS is trying to protect").
231 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 511 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the patient whose cells were used in the development
of a profitable cell line was entitled to compensation from the moment his cells
were utilized and long before a patent was issued for the cell line). Even though
obtaining a patent for a newly created product is one method of ensuring
revenues, it is not the only method, and profits may be granted to the provider
of necessary materials without the existence of a patent. See Roy Hardiman,
Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in
the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 223 (1986)
(noting the significance of agreements in the protection of economic rights in
new creations by pointing out that "[b]esides patent protection, intangible
property rights in human biologics arise through contractual ordering"). In
addition to ordinary contracts, economic rights in newly created products may be
secured by trade secrets, which provide protection without adhering to the strict
requirements of patentability and are, therefore, "popular among biotechnology
companies." Moore, 793 P.2d at 514 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
232 See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text (discussing the various
ways in which profit-sharing would enable the federal government to increase
environmental protection and biodiversity preservation).
233 See Bryan S. Schultz, Comment, Electronic Money, Internet Commerce,
and the Right to Financial Privacy: A Call for New Federal Guidelines, 67 U.
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As profit-sharing has become an area of increasing concern,
particularly at the international level, it must be addressed in the
United States in a manner that will ensure consistent resolution.
This is particularly important in light of the significant advantages
that will result from profit-sharing once it is accepted and imple-
mented with respect to all federal public lands. While Congress has
taken a first step in that direction in enacting NPOMA, the statute
still lacks specificity to be fully efficient on its own. Therefore,
either new legislation or amendments to NPOMA are needed to
ensure that the potential advantages of profit-sharing will occur and
benefit the public.
CONCLUSION
Bioprospecting on public lands is a lucrative and pervasive
industry. In light of increasing demand for bioprospecting permits,
the government should share in the profits derived from bio-
prospecting activities. Profit-sharing should not be viewed as a
negative development that will harm the environment. Rather, it
should be considered as a useful tool to ensure that the agencies
managing public lands have sufficient funds to further their
environmental protection objectives, thereby benefitting the public
at large.
Despite broad recognition that the issue of profit-sharing needs
resolution, very little has been done in that direction. Even though
NPOMA is a first step, additional provisions are still needed to
ensure that profit-sharing is developed in a positive manner and
does not lead to pure commercialization of wild genetic resources
CIN. L. REv. 779, 800-05 (1999) (explaining that existing statutory and common
law is insufficient to resolve all the privacy issues raised by commercial
transactions conducted over the Internet, and proposing new legislation to address
those issues). Clear guidelines are needed in the area of Internet transactions and,
even though a few federal statutes already exist, they are limited in scope and
fail to provide the safeguards that have become necessary as a result of such
transactions. Id. at 800-07. Even though Schultz focuses on Internet transactions,
an area very different from that at issue in Edmonds Institute, an analogy
arguably can be drawn between the two because they are both areas that cannot
be left to the courts for regulation and that need legislation in order to keep their
significant places in modem society.
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found on public lands. Additionally, the court in Edmonds Institute
should allow the NPS to enter into a CRADA that provides for
profit-sharing. Such judicial precedent would be an additional step
in assisting federal land management agencies with their task and
in ensuring that profit-sharing becomes a widely recognized
practice in the future.
As the benefits of profit-sharing to the government, the public,
and the environment become more evident with the implementation
of new CRADAs, it is essential that a legislative and judicial
framework be developed to address the issues raised by those
CRADAs. Since existing legal doctrines are not satisfactory to
address and expand the concept of profit-sharing, additional steps
must be taken in that direction. Those steps should recognize that
profit-sharing is both inevitable and beneficial and, thus, should be
widely permitted.

